相关论文: An Axiomatic Theory of Tie-Breaking: Impossibility…

Subtraction games have a rich literature as normal-play combinatorial games (e.g., Berlekamp, Conway, and Guy, 1982). Recently, the theory has been extended to zero-sum scoring play (Cohensius et al. 2019). Here, we take the approach of…

We consider two-player contests with the possibility of ties and study the effect of different tie-breaking rules on effort. For ratio-form and difference-form contests that admit pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, we find that the effort of…

If the final position of a team is already secured independently of the outcomes of the remaining games in a round-robin tournament, it might play with little enthusiasm. This is detrimental to attendance and can inspire collusion and…

Axiomatizing mathematical structures and theories is an objective of Mathematical Logic. Some axiomatic systems are nowadays mere definitions, such as the axioms of Group Theory; but some systems are much deeper, such as the axioms of…

We study mechanism which operate on ordinal preference information (i.e., rank ordered lists of alternatives) on the full domain of weak preferences that admits indifferences. We present a novel decomposition of strategyproofness into three…

We present a general theorem for distributed synthesis problems in coordination games with $\omega$-regular objectives of the form: If there exists a winning strategy for the coalition, then there exists an "essential" winning strategy,…

We present a new fragment of axiomatic set theory for pure sets and for the iteration of power sets within given transitive sets. It turns out that this formal system admits an interesting hierarchy of models with true membership relation…

The paper presents a hierarchical Bayesian model for simultaneous inference of tournament graphs and informant error. From multiple informant reports or measurement instrument outputs, the model estimates the structure of a criterion (i.e.,…

Game theory provides a mathematical framework for analysing strategic situations involving at least two players. Normal-form games model situations where the players simultaneously pick their moves. In this thesis we explore the strategic…

Given a set of people and a set of events they attend, we address the problem of measuring connectedness or tie strength between each pair of persons given that attendance at mutual events gives an implicit social network between people. We…

In~[1],authors considered a general finite horizon model of dynamic game of asymmetric information, where N players have types evolving as independent Markovian process, where each player observes its own type perfectly and actions of all…

How can the information that a set ${X_{1},...,X_{n}}$ of random variables contains about another random variable $S$ be decomposed? To what extent do different subgroups provide the same, i.e. shared or redundant, information, carry unique…

We present a self-stabilizing algorithm for the (asynchronous) unison problem which achieves an efficient trade-off between time, workload, and space in a weak model. Precisely, our algorithm is defined in the atomic-state model and works…

Ranking individuals based on their performance in different coalitions is a problem emerging in various domains (teams sports, scientific evaluation, argumentation, etc.). Often, for practical reasons, the number of comparable coalitions is…

We study the problem of sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues axiomatically. Our key axiom is anonymity, the classical impartiality axiom. Other impartiality axioms already studied in these problems are equal treatment of…

Drafts are sequential round-robin allocation procedures for distributing heterogeneous and indivisible objects among agents subject to some priority order (e.g., allocating players' contract rights to teams in professional sports leagues).…

We study the mechanism design problem of allocating a set of indivisible items without monetary transfers. Despite the vast literature on this very standard model, it still remains unclear how do truthful mechanisms look like. We focus on…

In this paper we provide three new results axiomatizing the core of games in characteristic function form (not necessarily having transferable utility) obeying an innocuous condition (that the set of individually rational pay-off vectors is…

Here we present a ground-breaking new postulate for game theory. The first part of this postulate contains the axiomatic observation that all games are created by a designer, whether they are: e.g., (dynamic/static) or…

We present syntactic characterisations for the union closed fragments of existential second-order logic and of logics with team semantics. Since union closure is a semantical and undecidable property, the normal form we introduce enables…