相关论文: Bank Runs With and Without Bank Failure
Why do banks fail? We create a panel covering most commercial banks from 1863 through 2024 to study the history of failing banks in the United States. Failing banks are characterized by rising asset losses, deteriorating solvency, and an…
Bank failures can stem from runs on otherwise solvent banks or from losses that render banks insolvent, regardless of withdrawals. Disentangling the relative importance of liquidity and solvency in explaining bank failures is central to…
As economic entities become increasingly interconnected, a shock in a financial network can provoke significant cascading failures throughout the system. To study the systemic risk of financial systems, we create a bi-partite banking…
The fragility of financial systems was starkly demonstrated in early 2023 through a cascade of major bank failures in the United States, including the second, third, and fourth largest collapses in the US history. The highly interdependent…
We report a study of a stylized banking cascade model investigating systemic risk caused by counter party failure using liabilities and assets to define banks' balance sheet. In our stylized system, banks can be in two states: normally…
We consider the problem of governing systemic risk in a banking system model. The banking system model consists in an initial value problem for a system of stochastic differential equations whose dependent variables are the log-monetary…
Various works have already showed that common shocks and cross-country financial linkages caused the banking systems of several countries to be highly interconnected with the result that during bad times, banking crises may arise…
We investigate the macroeconomic consequences of narrow banking in the context of stock-flow consistent models. We begin with an extension of the Goodwin-Keen model incorporating time deposits, government bills, cash, and central bank…
The global financial crisis in 2007-2009 demonstrated that systemic risk can spread all over the world through a complex web of financial linkages, yet we still lack fundamental knowledge about the evolution of the financial web. In…
Interbank lending and borrowing occur when financial institutions seek to settle and refinance their mutual positions over time and circumstances. This interactive process involves money creation at the aggregate level. Coordination…
Based on an empirical analysis of the network structure of the Austrian inter-bank market, we study the flow of funds through the banking network following exogenous shocks to the system. These shocks are implemented by stochastic changes…
The 2023 U.S. banking crisis propagated not through direct financial linkages but through a high-frequency, information-based contagion channel. This paper moves beyond exploration analysis to test the "too-similar-to-fail" hypothesis,…
Interbank contagion can theoretically exacerbate losses in a financial system and lead to additional cascade defaults during downturn. In this paper we produce default analysis using both regression and neural network models to verify…
This paper investigates two mechanisms of financial contagion that are, firstly, the correlated exposure of banks to the same source of risk, and secondly the direct exposure of banks in the interbank market. It will consider a random…
We consider a dynamic model of interconnected banks. New banks can emerge, and existing banks can default, creating a birth-and-death setup. Microscopically, banks evolve as independent geometric Brownian motions. Systemic effects are…
Complex non-linear interactions between banks and assets we model by two time-dependent Erd\H{o}s Renyi network models where each node, representing bank, can invest either to a single asset (model I) or multiple assets (model II). We use…
Operational risk is the risk relative to monetary losses caused by failures of bank internal processes due to heterogeneous causes. A dynamical model including both spontaneous generation of losses and generation via interactions between…
The 2008 financial crisis illustrated the need for a thorough, functional understanding of systemic risk in strongly interconnected financial structures. Dynamic processes on complex networks being intrinsically difficult, most recent…
We consider financial networks, where banks are connected by contracts such as debts or credit default swaps. We study the clearing problem in these systems: we want to know which banks end up in a default, and what portion of their…
An interbank market lets participants pool the risk arising from the combination of illiquid investments and random withdrawals by depositors. But it also creates the potential for one bank's failure to trigger off avalanches of further…