相关论文: Conquering the Multiverse: The River Voting Method…

Leader Election (LE) is crucial in distributed systems and blockchain technology, ensuring one participant acts as the leader. Traditional LE methods often depend on distributed random number generation (RNG), facing issues like…

Ranked Choice Voting (RCV) adoption is expanding across U.S. elections, but faces persistent criticism for complexity, strategic manipulation, and ballot exhaustion. We empirically test these concerns on real election data, across three…

This paper investigates the problem of selecting the embedding dimension for large heterogeneous networks that have weakly distinguishable community structure. For a broad family of embeddings based on normalized adjacency matrices, we…

Fairness in clustering has been considered extensively in the past; however, the trade-off between the two objectives -- e.g., can we sacrifice just a little in the quality of the clustering to significantly increase fairness, or…

Peer reviews, evaluations, and selections are a fundamental aspect of modern science. Funding bodies the world over employ experts to review and select the best proposals from those submitted for funding. The problem of peer selection,…

Voting is a very general method of preference aggregation. A voting rule takes as input every voter's vote (typically, a ranking of the alternatives), and produces as output either just the winning alternative or a ranking of the…

Studying the computational complexity and designing fast algorithms for determining winners under voting rules are classical and fundamental questions in computational social choice. In this paper, we accelerate voting by leveraging quantum…

Channel (or 3D filter) pruning serves as an effective way to accelerate the inference of neural networks. There has been a flurry of algorithms that try to solve this practical problem, each being claimed effective in some ways. Yet, a…

While most methods for solving mixed-integer optimization problems compute a single optimal solution, a diverse set of near-optimal solutions can often lead to improved outcomes. We present a new method for finding a set of diverse…

It is well known that no reasonable voting rule is strategyproof. Moreover, the common Plurality rule is particularly prone to strategic behavior of the voters and empirical studies show that people often vote strategically in practice.…

This paper builds upon the work of Dougherty and Heckelman (2020) by determining the frequency that 13 voting systems violate Arrow's social choice criteria with up to six alternatives. These results determine which of the 13 voting…

In this paper, we investigate the so-called ODP-problem that has been formulated by Caragiannis and Micha [10]. Here, we are in a setting with two election alternatives out of which one is assumed to be correct. In ODP, the goal is to…

The issue of fairness in recommendation is becoming increasingly essential as Recommender Systems touch and influence more and more people in their daily lives. In fairness-aware recommendation, most of the existing algorithmic approaches…

Given a dataset of points in a metric space and an integer $k$, a diversity maximization problem requires determining a subset of $k$ points maximizing some diversity objective measure, e.g., the minimum or the average distance between two…

Online Contention Resolution Schemes (OCRS's) represent a modern tool for selecting a subset of elements, subject to resource constraints, when the elements are presented to the algorithm sequentially. OCRS's have led to some of the…

We discuss voting scenarios in which the set of voters (agents) and the set of alternatives are the same; that is, voters select a single representative from among themselves. Such a scenario happens, for instance, when a committee selects…

When selecting ideas or trying to find inspiration, designers often must sift through hundreds or thousands of ideas. This paper provides an algorithm to rank design ideas such that the ranked list simultaneously maximizes the quality and…

In this paper, we study voting rules on the interval domain, where the alternatives are arranged according to an externally given strict total order and voters report intervals of this order to indicate the alternatives they support. For…

We study a game theoretic model where a coalition of processors might collude to bias the outcome of the protocol, where we assume that the processors always prefer any legitimate outcome over a non-legitimate one. We show that the problems…

Classical spatial models of two-party competition typically predict convergence to the median voter, yet real-world party systems often exhibit persistent and asymmetric polarization. We develop a spatial model of two-party competition in…