相关论文: Explaining Tournament Solutions with Minimal Suppo…

A 3-tournament is a complete 3-uniform hypergraph where each edge has a special vertex designated as its tail. A vertex set $X$ dominates $T$ if every vertex not in $X$ is contained in an edge whose tail is in $X$. The domination number of…

We study tournaments where winning a rank-dependent prize requires passing a minimum performance standard. We show that, for any prize allocation, the optimal standard is always at a mode of performance that is weakly higher than the global…

The classical paradox of social choice theory asserts that there is no fair way to deterministically select a winner in an election among more than two candidates; the only definite collective preferences are between individual pairs of…

An $n$-tournament $T$ with vertex set $V$ is simple if there is no subset $M$ of $V$ such that $2\leq \left \vert M\right \vert \leq n-1$ and for every $x\in V\setminus M$, either $M\rightarrow x$ or $x \rightarrow M$. The simplicity index…

Predicting the winner of an election is a favorite problem both for news media pundits and computational social choice theorists. Since it is often infeasible to elicit the preferences of all the voters in a typical prediction scenario, a…

We form a "map of tournaments" by adapting the map framework from the world of elections. By a tournament we mean a complete directed graph where the nodes are the players and an edge points from a winner of a game to the loser (with no…

Individual sports competitions provide a natural setting for examining the relative importance of talent and luck/chance in achieving success. The belief that success is primarily due to individual abilities and hard work rather than…

Competitive tournaments appear in sports, politics, population ecology, and animal behavior. All of these fields have developed methods for rating competitors and ranking them accordingly. A tournament is intransitive if it is not…

Condorcet's paradox is a fundamental result in social choice theory which states that there exist elections in which, no matter which candidate wins, a majority of voters prefer a different candidate. In fact, even if we can select any $k$…

This paper explores a novel way for analyzing the tournament structures to find a best suitable one for the tournament under consideration. It concerns about three aspects such as tournament conducting cost, competitiveness development and…

Probabilistic properties of tennis scoring systems are examined and compared with best-of-K systems. A model, where each player has his/her own probability of winning his/her service point and which remains invariant for the duration of the…

We study the effects of randomness on competitions based on an elementary random process in which there is a finite probability that a weaker team upsets a stronger team. We apply this model to sports leagues and sports tournaments, and…

The score set of a tournament is defined as the set of its distinct out-degrees. In 1978, Reid proposed the conjecture that for any set of nonnegative integers $D$, there exists a tournament $T$ with a degree set $D$. In 1989, Yao presented…

The Possible-Winner problem asks, given an election where the voters' preferences over the set of candidates is partially specified, whether a distinguished candidate can become a winner. In this work, we consider the computational…

Parity games are abstract infinite-round games that take an important role in formal verification. In the basic setting, these games are two-player, turn-based, and played under perfect information on directed graphs, whose nodes are…

Given subsets of uncertain values, we study the problem of identifying the subset of minimum total value (sum of the uncertain values) by querying as few values as possible. This set selection problem falls into the field of explorable…

Ranking the participants of a tournament has applications in voting, paired comparisons analysis, sports and other domains. In this paper we introduce bipartite tournaments, which model situations in which two different kinds of entity…

We consider a tournament $T=(V, A)$. For $X\subseteq V$, the subtournament of $T$ induced by $X$ is $T[X] = (X, A \cap (X \times X))$. An interval of $T$ is a subset $X$ of $V$ such that for $a, b\in X$ and $ x\in V\setminus X$, $(a,x)\in…

We present a general theorem for distributed synthesis problems in coordination games with $\omega$-regular objectives of the form: If there exists a winning strategy for the coalition, then there exists an "essential" winning strategy,…

Reid conjectured that any finite set of non-negative integers is the score set of some tournament and Yao gave a non-constructive proof of Reid's conjecture using arithmetic arguments. No constructive proof has been found since. In this…