相关论文: Optimal Dynamic Fees in Automated Market Makers

Dynamic pricing schemes were introduced as an alternative to posted-price mechanisms. In contrast to static models, the dynamic setting allows to update the prices between buyer-arrivals based on the remaining sets of items and buyers, and…

Constant Function Market Makers (CFMMs) are a tool for creating exchange markets, have been deployed effectively in prediction markets, and are now especially prominent in the Decentralized Finance ecosystem. We show that for any set of…

Prediction markets allow traders to bet on potential future outcomes. These markets exist for weather, political, sports, and economic forecasting. Within this work we consider a decentralized framework for prediction markets using…

This paper compares mathematical models for automated market makers including logarithmic market scoring rule (LMSR), liquidity sensitive LMSR (LS-LMSR), constant product/mean/sum, and others. It is shown that though LMSR may not be a good…

An automated market maker (AMM) is a state machine that manages pools of assets, allowing parties to buy and sell those assets according to a fixed mathematical formula. AMMs are typically implemented as smart contracts on blockchains, and…

We suggest a framework to determine optimal trading fees for constant function market makers (CFMMs) in order to maximize liquidity provider returns. In a setting of multiple competing liquidity pools, we show that no race to the bottom…

Automated market makers (AMM) have grown to obtain significant market share within the cryptocurrency ecosystem, resulting in a proliferation of new products pursuing exotic strategies for horizontal differentiation. Yet, their theoretical…

Automated Market Makers (AMMs) are a cornerstone of decentralized finance. They are smart contracts (stateful programs) running on blockchains. They enable virtual token exchange: traders swap tokens with the AMM for a fee, while liquidity…

Designing automated market makers (AMMs) is crucial for decentralized token exchanges in cryptoeconomic systems. At the intersection of software engineering and economics, AMM design is complex and, if done incorrectly, can lead to…

Triangle fees are a novel fee structure for AMMs, in which marginal fees are decreasing in a trade's size. That decline is proportional to the movement in the AMM's implied price, i.e. for every basis point the trade moves the ratio of…

We investigate the most common type of blockchain-based decentralized exchange, which are known as constant function market makers (CFMMs). We examine the the market microstructure around CFMMs and present a model for valuing the liquidity…

In this paper we introduce the problem of dynamic pricing of power for smart-grid networks. This is studied within a network utility maximization (NUM) framework in a deterministic setting with a single provider, multiple users and a finite…

We study the problem of optimal liquidity withdrawal for a representative liquidity provider (LP) in an automated market maker (AMM). LPs earn fees from trading activity but are exposed to impermanent loss (IL) due to price fluctuations.…

Optimizing within the affine maximizer auctions (AMA) is an effective approach for revenue maximizing mechanism design. The AMA mechanisms are strategy-proof and individually rational (if the agents' valuations for the outcomes are…

Automated Market Makers (AMMs) are major centers of matching liquidity supply and demand in Decentralized Finance. Their functioning relies primarily on the presence of liquidity providers (LPs) incentivized to invest their assets into a…

This paper studies the question whether automated market maker protocols such as Uniswap can sustainably retain a portion of their trading fees for the protocol. We approach the problem by modelling how to optimally choose a pool's take…

We introduce a new class of automated market maker (AMM), the \emph{partially active automated market maker} (PA-AMM). PA-AMM divides its reserves into two parts, the active and the passive parts, and uses only the active part for trading.…

Public blockchains implement a fee mechanism to allocate scarce computational resources across competing transactions. Most existing fee market designs utilize a joint, fungible unit of account (e.g., gas in Ethereum) to price otherwise…

This paper presents a dynamic pricing and energy management framework for electric vehicle (EV) charging service providers. To set the charging prices, the service providers faces three uncertainties: the volatility of wholesale electricity…

We develop an axiomatic theory for Automated Market Makers (AMMs) in local energy sharing markets and analyze the Markov Perfect Equilibrium of the resulting economy with a Mean-Field Game. In this game, heterogeneous prosumers solve a…