相关论文: Optimal Dynamic Fees in Automated Market Makers

Dynamic mechanism design is a challenging extension to ordinary mechanism design in which the mechanism designer must make a sequence of decisions over time in the face of possibly untruthful reports of participating agents. Optimizing…

Decentralized exchanges (DEXs) face persistent challenges in liquidity retention and user engagement due to inefficiencies in conventional automated market maker (AMM) designs. This work proposes a dual-mechanism framework to address these…

Automated Market Makers (AMMs) are a class of smart contracts on Ethereum and other blockchains that "make markets" autonomously. In other words, AMMs stand ready to trade with other market participants that interact with them, at the…

Constant function market makers (CFMMs) are a popular decentralized exchange mechanism and have recently been the subject of much research, but major CFMMs give traders no privacy. Prior work proposes randomly splitting and shuffling trades…

We consider an exchange who wishes to set suitable make-take fees to attract liquidity on its platform. Using a principal-agent approach, we are able to describe in quasi-explicit form the optimal contract to propose to a market maker. This…

Decentralized exchanges are widely used platforms for trading crypto assets. The most common types work with automated market makers (AMM), allowing traders to exchange assets without needing to find matching counterparties. Thereby,…

With the emergence of decentralized finance, new trading mechanisms called Automated Market Makers have appeared. The most popular Automated Market Makers are Constant Function Market Makers. They have been studied both theoretically and…

Automated market makers (AMMs) are a new type of trading venues which are revolutionising the way market participants interact. At present, the majority of AMMs are constant function market makers (CFMMs) where a deterministic trading…

Blockchains have popularized automated market makers (AMMs). An AMM exchange is an application running on a blockchain which maintains a pool of crypto-assets and automatically trades assets with users governed by some pricing function that…

Following the recent literature on make take fees policies, we consider an exchange wishing to set a suitable contract with several market makers in order to improve trading quality on its platform. To do so, we use a principal-agent…

This paper develops a rigorous mathematical framework for analyzing Concentrated Liquidity Market Makers (CLMMs) in Decentralized Finance (DeFi) within a continuous-time setting. We model the evolution of liquidity profiles as…

This article explores the optimisation of trading strategies in Constant Function Market Makers (CFMMs) and centralised exchanges. We develop a model that accounts for the interaction between these two markets, estimating the conditional…

We investigate the market microstructure of Automated Market Makers (AMMs), the most prominent type of blockchain-based decentralized exchanges. We show that the order execution mechanism yields token value loss for liquidity providers if…

Automated market makers (AMMs) are pricing mechanisms utilized by decentralized exchanges (DEX). Traditional AMM approaches are constrained by pricing solely based on their own liquidity pool, without consideration of external markets or…

In decentralized finance ("DeFi"), automated market makers (AMMs) enable traders to programmatically exchange one asset for another. Such trades are enabled by the assets deposited by liquidity providers (LPs). The goal of this paper is to…

Automated market makers (AMMs) are smart contracts that automatically trade electronic assets according to a mathematical formula. This paper investigates how an AMM's formula affects the interests of liquidity providers, who endow the AMM…

Automated Market Makers (AMMs) are an integral component of the decentralized finance (DeFi) ecosystem, as they allow users to exchange crypto-assets without the need for trusted authorities or external price oracles. Although these…

We study decentralized markets for goods whose utility perishes in time, with compute as a primary motivation. Recent advances in reproducible and verifiable execution allow jobs to pause, verify, and resume across heterogeneous hardware,…

We consider a trading marketplace that is populated by traders with diverse trading strategies and objectives. The marketplace allows the suppliers to list their goods and facilitates matching between buyers and sellers. In return, such a…

We consider the impact of trading fees on the profits of arbitrageurs trading against an automated market maker (AMM) or, equivalently, on the adverse selection incurred by liquidity providers (LPs) due to arbitrage. We extend the model of…