相关论文: Non-obvious Manipulability in Hedonic Games with F…

In this work, we consider the design of Non-Obviously Manipulable (NOM) mechanisms, mechanisms that bounded rational agents may fail to recognize as manipulable, for two relevant classes of succinctly representable Hedonic Games: Additively…

Additively separable hedonic games and fractional hedonic games have received considerable attention. They are coalition forming games of selfish agents based on their mutual preferences. Most of the work in the literature characterizes the…

We consider the complexity of maximizing egalitarian welfare in Friends and Enemies Games -- a subclass of hedonic games in which every agent partitions other agents into friends and enemies. We investigate two classic scenarios proposed in…

Hedonic games model settings in which a set of agents have to be partitioned into groups which we call coalitions. In the enemy aversion model, each agent has friends and enemies, and an agent prefers to be in a coalition with as few…

In the problem of allocating a single non-disposable commodity among agents whose preferences are single-peaked, we study a weakening of strategy-proofness called not obvious manipulability (NOM). If agents are cognitively limited, then NOM…

Partitioning a set of $n$ items or agents while maximizing the value of the partition is a fundamental algorithmic task. We study this problem in the specific setting of maximizing social welfare in additively separable hedonic games.…

Additively separable hedonic games (ASHGs) are a prominent model of coalition formation where agents' preferences are derived from their individual valuations of peers. While social welfare maximization in ASHGs has traditionally focused…

In this paper, we study a variant of hedonic games, called \textsc{Seat Arrangement}. The model is defined by a bijection from agents with preferences for each other to vertices in a graph $G$. The utility of an agent depends on the…

A recent line of work in mechanism design has focused on guaranteeing incentive compatibility for agents without contingent reasoning skills: obviously strategyproof mechanisms guarantee that it is "obvious" for these imperfectly rational…

In problems involving the allocation of a single non-disposable commodity, we study rules defined on a general domain of preferences requiring only that each preference exhibit a unique global maximum. Our focus is on rules that satisfy a…

We study coalition formation in the framework of fractional hedonic games (FHGs). The objective is to maximize social welfare in an online model where agents arrive one by one and must be assigned to coalitions immediately and irrevocably.…

Nguyen et al. [1] introduced altruistic hedonic games in which agents' utilities depend not only on their own preferences but also on those of their friends in the same coalition. We propose to extend their model to coalition formation…

We consider the fundamental problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods among strategic agents with additive valuation functions. It is well known that, in the absence of monetary transfers, Pareto efficient and truthful rules are…

We investigate verification and existence problems for prominent stability concepts in hedonic games with friends, enemies, and optionally with neutrals [8, 16]. We resolve several (long-standing) open questions [4, 16, 20, 23] and show…

We consider a coalition formation setting where each agent belongs to one of the two types, and agents' preferences over coalitions are determined by the fraction of the agents of their own type in each coalition. This setting differs from…

With the development of artificial intelligence, human beings are increasingly interested in human-agent collaboration, which generates a series of problems about the relationship between agents and humans, such as trust and cooperation.…

This paper proposes a novel game-theoretical autonomous decision-making framework to address a task allocation problem for a swarm of multiple agents. We consider cooperation of self-interested agents, and show that our proposed…

Hedonic games formalize coalition formation scenarios where players evaluate an outcome based on the coalition they are contained in. Due to a large number of possible coalitions, compact representations of these games are crucial. We…

Fractional hedonic games are coalition formation games where a player's utility is determined by the average value they assign to the members of their coalition. These games are a variation of graph hedonic games, which are a class of…

In this paper, we examine \emph{hedonic coalition formation games} in which each player's preferences over partitions of players depend only on the members of his coalition. We present three main results in which restrictions on the…