相关论文: Set-Theoretic Hypodoxes and co-Russell's Paradox

Two types of approximation to the paradoxical Russell Set are presented, one approximating it from below, one from above. It is shown that any lower approximation gives rise to a better approximation containing it, and that any upper…

Following F. William Lawvere, we show that many self-referential paradoxes, incompleteness theorems and fixed point theorems fall out of the same simple scheme. We demonstrate these similarities by showing how this simple scheme encompasses…

Mathematicians invented Mathematics to escape from words, but at last they depend on them just as much as everybody else. At the end, all basic definitions will be reliant on words, yet the mathematician believes that he's elevated from…

The semantic paradoxes are associated with self-reference or referential circularity. However, there are infinitary versions of the paradoxes, such as Yablo's paradox, that do not involve this form of circularity. It remains an open…

This article discusses the logical errors in the liar paradox, G\"odel's incompleteness theorems, Russell's paradox, and the halting problem. In order to avoid these errors, a redefinition of logic has been presented, which is concluded as…

The inconsistencies involved in the foundation of set theory were invariably caused by infinity and self-reference; and only with the opportune axiomatic restrictions could them be obviated. Throughout history, both concepts have proved to…

In this paper, we present a paradox arising from the acceptance of the Law of Excluded Middle (LEM) within classical mathematics. Specifically, we construct a nonzero analytic function on a connected open subset of the complex plane whose…

Russell's paradox is the most easily understandable way to illustrate the inconsistency of na\"ive set theory. This note proposes a direct encoding of Russell's paradox with type-in-type universe, sigma types, and either extensional…

This paper gives a counterexample to the impossibility, by G\"odel's second incompleteness theorem, of proving a formula expressing the consistency of arithmetic in a fragment of arithmetic on the assumption that the latter is consistent.…

The Union Closed Sets Conjecture states that in every finite, nontrivial set family closed under taking unions there is an element contained in at least half of all the sets of the family. We investigate two new directions with respect to…

Many writers have observed that default logics appear to contain the "lottery paradox" of probability theory. This arises when a default "proof by contradiction" lets us conclude that a typical X is not a Y where Y is an unusual subclass of…

Ernst Zermelo's axiomatization of set theory (1908) did not exclude `a set that is a member of itself'. We call a set that is a member of itself `an individual'. In this article we prove the elimination of Russell's paradox is equivalent to…

The methodology used here might provide a neat method of examining paradoxes and ways to circumvent them. Most of the known set theoretic paradoxes (Russell's, Cantor's, Burali-Forti's,..) can be paralleled here and examined. This account…

Set theory is widely believed to provide a secure foundation for deductive mathematics, but current set theories do not quite do this. The mainstream essentially uses na\"\i ve set theory. After Russell's paradox showed this to be…

In this paper, we consider the problem of making skeptical inferences for the multi-label ranking problem. We assume that our uncertainty is described by a convex set of probabilities (i.e. a credal set), defined over the set of labels.…

We give a new proof for Godel's second incompleteness theorem, based on Kolmogorov complexity, Chaitin's incompleteness theorem, and an argument that resembles the surprise examination paradox. We then go the other way around and suggest…

If the complement of a closed convex set in a closed convex cone is bounded, then this complement minus the apex of the cone is called a coconvex set. Coconvex sets appear in singularity theory (they are closely related to Newton diagrams)…

This work presents theorems which state (i) Z is a proper subset for any bijection f between A and Z, where Z is contained in P(A), A is a non-finite set and |Z|=|A|, and (ii) being Z a proper subset of P(A) nothing affirms or denies that…

A new mathematical object called a skand is introduced, which turns out in general to be a non-well-founded set. Skands of finite lengths are ordinary well-founded sets, and skands of very long length (like the hyper-skand of all ordinals)…

We consider a set-theoretic version of mereology based on the inclusion relation $\subseteq$ and analyze how well it might serve as a foundation of mathematics. After establishing the non-definability of $\in$ from $\subseteq$, we identify…