相关论文: Equilibria in a Hypercube Spatial Voting Model

Learning problems commonly exhibit an interesting feedback mechanism wherein the population data reacts to competing decision makers' actions. This paper formulates a new game theoretic framework for this phenomenon, called "multi-player…

We propose a general class of symmetric games called position-optimization games. Given a probability distribution $Q$ over a set of targets $\mathcal{Y}$, the $n$ players each choose a position in a space $\mathcal{X}$. A player's utility…

Voting is a commonly applied method for the aggregation of the preferences of multiple agents into a joint decision. If preferences are binary, i.e., "yes" and "no", every voting system can be described by a (monotone) Boolean function…

Cooperation through repetition is an important theme in game theory. In this regard, various celebrated ``folk theorems'' have been proposed for repeated games in increasingly more complex environments. There has, however, been insufficient…

In the paper we present a model of discrete-time mean-field game with several populations of players. Mean-field games with multiple populations of the players have only been studied in the literature in the continuous-time setting. The…

We study decentralized equilibrium selection in stochastic games under severe information and communication constraints. In such settings, convergence to equilibrium alone is insufficient, as stochastic games typically admit many equilibria…

Coordination games describe social or economic interactions in which the adoption of a common strategy has a higher payoff. They are classically used to model the spread of conventions, behaviors, and technologies in societies. Here we…

We consider the explicit introduction of firms' choice of location to Varian's model of sales for a two-stage spatial competition model based on a standard Hotelling's linear city model. This model is the formalization of Varian's model of…

We use Hotelling's spatial model of competition to investigate the position-taking behaviour of political candidates under a class of electoral systems known as scoring rules. In a scoring rule election, voters rank all the candidates…

Establishing the existence of exact or near Markov or stationary perfect Nash equilibria in nonzero-sum Markov games over Borel spaces is a challenging problem with limited positive results. Motivated by problems in multi-agent and Bayesian…

We propose an exactly solvable model for the dynamics of voters in a two-party system. The opinion formation process is modeled on a random network of agents. The dynamical nature of interpersonal relations is also reflected in the model,…

Meirowitz [17] showed existence of continuous behavioural function equilibria for Bayesian games with non-finite type and action spaces. A key condition for the proof of the existence result is equi-continuity of behavioural functions…

In this paper, we analyze the mean number $E(n,d)$ of internal equilibria in a general $d$-player $n$-strategy evolutionary game where the agents' payoffs are normally distributed. First, we give a computationally implementable formula for…

We investigate a voting scenario with two groups of agents whose preferences depend on a ground truth that cannot be directly observed. The majority's preferences align with the ground truth, while the minorities disagree. Focusing on…

In this paper, we consider the social optimal problem of discrete time finite state space mean field games (referred to as finite mean field games [1]). Unlike the individual optimization of their own cost function in competitive models, in…

For cheap-talk games with a binary state space in which the sender has state-independent preferences, we characterize equilibria that are robust to introducing slight state-dependence on the side of the sender. Not all equilibria are…

In this paper, I characterize minimal stable voting rules and minimal self-stable constitutions (i.e., pairs of voting rules) for societies in which only power matters. To do so, I first let players' preference profiles over voting rules…

A new agent-based, bounded-confidence model for discrete one-dimensional opinion dynamics is presented. The agents interact if their opinions do not differ more than a tolerance parameter. In pairwise interactions, one of the pair, randomly…

We formulate two-party policy competition as a two-player non-cooperative game, generalizing Lin et al.'s work (2021). Each party selects a real-valued policy vector as its strategy from a compact subset of Euclidean space, and a voter's…

We introduce the class of pay or play games, which captures scenarios in which each decision maker is faced with a choice between two actions: one with a fixed payoff and an- other with a payoff dependent on others' selected actions. This…