相关论文: Existence and structure of Nash equilibria for sup…

We prove three results on the existence and structure of Nash equilibria for quasisupermodular games. A theorem is purely order-theoretic, and the other two involve topological hypotheses. Our topological results genralize Zhou's theorem…

We give two generalizations of the Zhou fixed point theorem. They weaken the subcompleteness condition of values, and relax the ascending condition of the correspondence. As an application, we derive a generalization of Topkis's theorem on…

To generalize complementarities for games, we introduce some conditions weaker than quasisupermodularity and the single crossing property. We prove that the Nash equilibria of a game satisfying these conditions form a nonempty complete…

We give a new order-theoretic characterization of a complete Heyting and co-Heyting algebra $C$. This result provides an unexpected relationship with the field of Nash equilibria, being based on the so-called Veinott ordering relation on…

This paper is devoted to Nash equilibrium for games in capacities. Such games with payoff expressed by Choquet integral were considered by Kozhan and Zarichnyi (Nash equilibria for games in capacities, Econ. Theory {\bf 35} (2008) 321--331)…

This document consists of two parts: the second part was submitted earlier as a new proof of Nash's theorem, and the first part is a note explaining a problem found in that proof. We are indebted to Sergiu Hart and Eran Shmaya for their…

We prove that, under appropriate conditions, an abstract game with quasi-Leontief payoff functions $u_i : \prod_{j=1}^nX_j\to\mathbb{R}$ has a Nash equilibria. When all the payoff functions are globally quasi-Leontief, the existence and the…

The theory of Monotone Comparative Statics (MCS) has traditionally required a lattice structure, excluding certain multidimensional environments such as mixed-strategy games where this property fails. We show that this structure is not…

We consider a class of N-player stochastic games of multi-dimensional singular control, in which each player faces a minimization problem of monotone-follower type with submodular costs. We call these games "monotone-follower games". In a…

We study the problem of computing all Nash equilibria of a subclass of finite normal form games. With algebraic characterization of the games, we present a method for computing all its Nash equilibria. Further, we present a method for…

Supermodular games find significant applications in a variety of models, especially in operations research and economic applications of noncooperative game theory, and feature pure strategy Nash equilibria characterized as fixed points of…

We consider two models of computation for Tarski's order preserving function f related to fixed points in a complete lattice: the oracle function model and the polynomial function model. In both models, we find the first polynomial time…

In Stackelberg v/s Stackelberg games a collection of leaders compete in a Nash game constrained by the equilibrium conditions of another Nash game amongst the followers. The resulting equilibrium problems are plagued by the nonuniqueness of…

We show that under some general conditions the finite memory determinacy of a class of two-player win/lose games played on finite graphs implies the existence of a Nash equilibrium built from finite memory strategies for the corresponding…

We study mean field games with scalar It{\^o}-type dynamics and costs that are submodular with respect to a suitable order relation on the state and measure space. The submodularity assumption has a number of interesting consequences.…

Nash equilibrium (NE) is a central concept in game theory. Here we prove formally a published theorem on existence of an NE in two proof assistants, Coq and Isabelle: starting from a game with finitely many outcomes, one may derive a game…

We introduce a class of Bayesian bidding games for which we prove that the set of pure Nash equilibria is a (non-empty) sublattice and we give a sufficient condition for uniqueness that is often verified in the context of markets with…

The Robinson-Goforth topology of swaps in adjoining payoffs elegantly arranges 2x2 ordinal games in accordance with important properties including symmetry, number of dominant strategies and Nash Equilibria, and alignment of interests.…

We present a unified framework for characterizing local Nash equilibria in continuous games on either infinite-dimensional or finite-dimensional non-convex strategy spaces. We provide intrinsic necessary and sufficient first- and…

We analyze the robustness of (pure strategy) Nash equilibria for network games against perturbations of the players' utility functions. We first derive a simple characterization of the margin of robustness, defined as the minimum magnitude…