相关论文: A Game Theoretic Approach to Sustainizability Over…
Evolutionary games are a developing sub-field of game theory. This branch of game theory is used in the study of the adaptation of large, but finite, populations of agents to changes in the environment. It assumes that each agent has no…
Game theory ideas provide a useful framework for studying evolutionary dynamics in a well-mixed environment. This approach, however, typically enforces a strictly fixed overall population size, deemphasizing natural growth processes. We…
The generalized Lotka-Volterra (gLV) equations, a classic model from theoretical ecology, describe the population dynamics of a set of interacting species. As the number of species in these systems grow in number, their dynamics become…
We consider ordinary differential equations on the unit simplex of $\RR^n$ that naturally occur in population games, models of learning and self reinforced random processes. Generalizing and relying on an idea introduced in \cite{DF11}, we…
Lotka-Volterra (LV) equations play a key role in the mathematical modeling of various ecological, biological and chemical systems. When the number of species (or, depending on the viewpoint, chemical components) becomes large, basic but…
A new mathematical model for evolutionary games on graphs is proposed to extend the classical replicator equation to finite populations of players organized on a network with generic topology. Classical results from game theory,…
Multispecies ecosystems modelled by generalized Lotka-Volterra equations exhibit stationary population abundances, where large number of species often coexist. Understanding the precise conditions under which this is at all feasible and…
Evolutionary game dynamics are often studied in the context of different population structures. Here we propose a new population structure that is inspired by simple multicellular life forms. In our model, cells reproduce but can stay…
We consider evolutionary dynamics for population games in which players have a continuum of strategies at their disposal. Models in this setting amount to infinite-dimensional differential equations evolving on the manifold of probability…
We show that evolutionarily stable states in general (nonlinear) population games (which can be viewed as continuous vector fields constrained on a polytope) are asymptotically stable under a multiplicative weights dynamic (under…
Many socio-economic and biological processes can be modeled as systems of interacting individuals. The behaviour of such systems can be often described within game-theoretic models. In these lecture notes, we introduce fundamental concepts…
Inferring microbial community structure based on temporal metagenomics data is an important goal in microbiome studies. The deterministic generalized Lotka-Volterra differential (GLV) equations have been used to model the dynamics of…
In population games, a large population of players, modeled as a continuum, is divided into subpopulations, and the fitness or payoff of each subpopulation depends on the overall population composition. Evolutionary dynamics describe how…
In this work, we explore the dynamics of species abundances within ecological communities using the Generalized Lotka-Volterra (GLV) model. At variance with previous approaches, we present an analysis of stochastic GLV dynamics with…
We first present a predator-prey model for two species and then extend the model to three species where the two predator species engage in mutualistic predation. Constant effort harvesting and the impact of by-catch issue are also…
The relationship between the M-species stochastic Lotka-Volterra competition (SLVC) model and the M-allele Moran model of population genetics is explored via timescale separation arguments. When selection for species is weak and the…
In this work, we study the social learning problem, in which agents of a networked system collaborate to detect the state of the nature based on their private signals. A novel distributed graphical evolutionary game theoretic learning…
We consider strong law of large numbers (SLLN) in the framework of game-theoretic probability of Shafer and Vovk (2001). We prove several versions of SLLN for the case that Reality's moves are unbounded. Our game-theoretic versions of SLLN…
Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is an important solution concept in game theory which has been applied frequently to biological models. Informally an ESS is a strategy that if followed by the population cannot be taken over by a…
We use the indirect evolutionary approach to study evolutionarily stable preferences against multiple mutations in single- and multi-population matching settings, respectively. Players choose strategies to maximize their subjective…