相关论文: Game of arrivals at a two queue network with heter…

Suppose customers need to choose when to arrive to a congested queue with some desired service at the end, provided by a single server that operates only during a certain time interval. We study a model where the customers incur not only…

We consider a game of decentralized timing of jobs to a single server (machine) with a penalty for deviation from a due date, and no delay costs. The jobs' sizes are homogeneous and deterministic. Each job belongs to a single decision…

We consider strategic arrivals to a FCFS service system that starts service at a fixed time and has to serve a fixed number of customers, e.g., an airplane boarding system. Arriving early induces a higher waiting cost (waiting before…

We study the problem of strategic choice of arrival time to a single-server queue with opening and closing times when there is uncertainty regarding service speed. A Poisson population of customers choose their arrival time with the goal of…

We consider a discrete population of users with homogeneous service demand who need to decide when to arrive to a system in which the service rate deteriorates linearly with the number of users in the system. The users have heterogeneous…

Consider a population of customers each of which needs to decide independently when to arrive to a facility that provides a service during a fixed period of time, say a day. This is a common scenario in many service systems such as a bank,…

We consider a queueing facility where customers decide when to arrive. All customers have the same desired arrival time (w.l.o.g.\ time zero). There is one server, and the service times are independent and exponentially distributed. The…

Queueing networks are typically modelled assuming that the arrival process is exogenous, and unaffected by admission control, scheduling policies, etc. In many situations, however, users choose the time of their arrival strategically,…

We consider an M/G/1 queue in which the customers, while waiting in line, may renege from it. We study the Nash equilibrium profile among customers, and show that it is defined by two sequences of thresholds. For each customer, the decision…

We analyse a non-cooperative strategic game among two ride-hailing platforms, each of which is modeled as a two-sided queueing system, where drivers (with a certain patience level) are assumed to arrive according to a Poisson process at a…

Today's queueing network systems are more rapidly evolving and more complex than those of even a few years ago. The goal of this paper is to study customers' behavior in an unobservable Markovian M/M/1 queue where consumers have to choose…

Many economic transactions, including those of online markets, have a time lag between the start and end times of transactions. Customers need to wait for completion of their transaction (order fulfillment) and hence are also interested in…

In this paper we present a new competitive packet routing model with edge priorities. We consider players that route selfishly through a network over time and try to reach their destinations as fast as possible. If the number of players who…

A single server commences its service at time zero every day. A random number of customers decide when to arrive to the system so as to minimize the waiting time and tardiness costs. The costs are proportional to the waiting time and the…

A multiclass queue with many servers is considered, where customers make a join-or-leave decision upon arrival based on queue length information, without knowing the scheduling policy or the state of other queues. A game theoretic…

We study service scheduling problems in a slotted system in which agents arrive with service requests according to a Bernoulli process and have to leave within two slots after arrival, service costs are quadratic in service rates, and there…

This work presents a variation of Naor's strategic observable model (1969), by adding a component of customer heterogeneity induced by the location of customers in relation to the server. Accordingly, customers incur a travel cost which…

We investigate the behavior of equilibria in an $M/M/1$ feedback queue where price and time sensitive customers are homogeneous with respect to service valuation and cost per unit time of waiting. Upon arrival, customers can observe the…

We study the strategic purchasing of priorities in a time-dependent accumulating priority M/G/$1$ queue. We formulate a non-cooperative game in which customers purchase priority coefficients with the goal of reducing waiting costs in…

We consider a large queueing system that consists of many strategic servers that are weakly interacting. Each server processes jobs from its unique critically loaded buffer and controls the rate of arrivals and departures associated with…