相关论文: On the Impact of Gaslighting on Partially Observed…

In security games, the solution concept commonly used is that of a Stackelberg equilibrium where the defender gets to commit to a mixed strategy. The motivation for this is that the attacker can repeatedly observe the defender's actions and…

We introduce games with probabilistic uncertainty, a natural model for controller synthesis in which the controller observes the state of the system through imprecise sensors that provide correct information about the current state with a…

This paper is concerned with a linear-quadratic partially observed Stackelberg stochastic differential game with correlated state and observation noises, where the diffusion coefficient does not contain the control variable and the control…

This paper is concerned with a Stackelberg stochastic differential game with asymmetric noisy observation, with one follower and one leader. In our model, the follower cannot observe the state process directly, but could observe a noisy…

Many real-world decision problems involve the interaction of multiple self-interested agents with limited sensing ability. The partially observable stochastic game (POSG) provides a mathematical framework for modeling these problems,…

Partially observable stochastic games provide a rich mathematical paradigm for modeling multi-agent dynamic decision making under uncertainty and partial information. However, they generally do not admit closed-form solutions and are…

Formulating cyber-security problems with attackers and defenders as a partially observable stochastic game has become a trend recently. Among them, the one-sided two-player zero-sum partially observable stochastic game (OTZ-POSG) has…

This paper studies a Stackelberg game wherein a sender (leader) attempts to shape the information of a less informed receiver (follower) who in turn takes an action that determines the payoff for both players. The sender chooses signals to…

Technology development efforts in autonomy and cyber-defense have been evolving independently of each other, over the past decade. In this paper, we report our ongoing effort to integrate these two presently distinct areas into a single…

We study an online learning problem in general-sum Stackelberg games, where players act in a decentralized and strategic manner. We study two settings depending on the type of information for the follower: (1) the limited information…

Network systems often contain vulnerabilities that remain unfixed in a network for various reasons, such as the lack of a patch or knowledge to fix them. With the presence of such residual vulnerabilities, the network administrator should…

This paper analyzes a finite horizon dynamic signaling game motivated by the well-known strategic information transmission problems in economics. The mathematical model involves information transmission between two agents, a sender who…

The stochastic optimal control of many agents is an important problem in various fields. We investigate the problem of partial observations, where the state of each agent is not fully observed and the control must be decided based on noisy…

The topics treated in this thesis are inherently two-fold. The first part considers the problem of a market maker optimally setting bid/ask quotes over a finite time horizon, to maximize her expected utility. The intensities of the orders…

The Stackelberg game depicts a leader-follower relationship wherein decisions are made sequentially, and the Stackelberg equilibrium represents an expected optimal solution when the leader can anticipate the rational response of the…

Adversarial decision-making in partially observable multi-agent systems requires sophisticated strategies for both deception and counter-deception. This paper presents a sequential hypothesis testing (SHT)-driven framework that captures the…

Most models of Stackelberg security games assume that the attacker only knows the defender's mixed strategy, but is not able to observe (even partially) the instantiated pure strategy. Such partial observation of the deployed pure strategy…

We study the optimal design of stealthy attacks against partially observed linear control systems. We first propose a novel likelihood-based detection mechanism derived from the innovation process, based on which we quantify stealthiness…

Strategic information disclosure, in its simplest form, considers a game between an information provider (sender) who has access to some private information that an information receiver is interested in. While the receiver takes an action…

In this paper we are interested in a new type of {\it mean-field}, non-Markovian stochastic control problems with partial observations. More precisely, we assume that the coefficients of the controlled dynamics depend not only on the paths…