相关论文: A Principal-Agent Model for Optimal Incentives in …
This paper explores stochastic control models in the context of decarbonization within the energy market. We study three progressively complex scenarios: (1) a single firm operating with two technologies-one polluting and one clean,(2)two…
We investigate the impact of a regulation policy imposed on an agent exploiting a possibly renewable natural resource. We adopt a principal-agent model in which the Principal looks for a contract, i.e. taxes/compensations, leading the Agent…
Despite the success of demand response programs in retail electricity markets in reducing average consumption, the random responsiveness of consumers to price event makes their efficiency questionable to achieve the flexibility needed for…
The focus on Renewable Energy Communities (REC) is fastly growing after the European Union (EU) has introduced a dedicated regulation in 2018. The idea of creating local groups of citizens, small- and medium-sized companies, and public…
This paper characterises optimal incentive schemes for ESG disclosure in a continuous-time principal-agent setting. We model a risk-averse principal (e.g., a platform or standard-setter) contracting with a team of heterogeneous agents whose…
As electrical generation becomes more distributed and volatile, and loads become more uncertain, controllability of distributed energy resources (DERs), regardless of their ownership status, will be necessary for grid reliability. Grid…
The impact of energy production significantly affects system sustainability, which has enabled a shift towards renewable energy sources. Thus, producer behavior is crucial in electricity markets to achieve sustainability goals. In this…
Uncertainties in renewable generation and demand dynamics challenge day-ahead scheduling. To enhance renewable penetration and maintain intra-day balance, we develop a multi-agent reinforcement learning framework for self-interested…
In this work we investigate the inefficiency of the electricity system with strategic agents. Specifically, we prove that without a proper control the total demand of an inefficient system is at most twice the total demand of the optimal…
Recent technology advances have enabled firms to flexibly process and analyze sophisticated employee performance data at a reduced and yet significant cost. We develop a theory of optimal incentive contracting where the monitoring…
Principal agent games are a growing area of research which focuses on the optimal behaviour of a principal and an agent, with the former contracting work from the latter, in return for providing a monetary award. While this field…
Motivated by the recent studies on the green bond market, we build a model in which an investor trades on a portfolio of green and conventional bonds, both issued by the same governmental entity. The government provides incentives to the…
We propose to study electricity capacity remuneration mechanism design through a Principal-Agent approach. The Principal represents the aggregation of electricity consumers (or a representative entity), subject to the physical risk of…
We develop a continuous-time model of incentives for carbon emissive firms to exit the market based on a compensation payment identical to all firms. In our model, firms enjoy profits from production modeled as a simple geometric Brownian…
We address the challenge of promoting sustainable practices in production forests managed by strategic entities (agents) that harvest agricultural commodities under concession agreements. These entities engage in activities that either…
This paper investigates the role of a transmission system operator within a carbon footprint reduction strategy incorporating carbon taxes and renewable energy generation subsidies in the decentralised energy market. This is achieved via an…
This paper develops incentive mechanisms for promoting eco-driving with the overarching goal of minimizing emissions in transportation networks. The system operator provides drivers with energy-efficient driving guidance throughout their…
We study a principal-agent team production model. The principal hires a team of agents to participate in a common production task. The exact effort of each agent is unobservable and unverifiable, but the total production outcome (e.g. the…
We consider an exchange who wishes to set suitable make-take fees to attract liquidity on its platform. Using a principal-agent approach, we are able to describe in quasi-explicit form the optimal contract to propose to a market maker. This…
As the share of renewable energy sources in the present electric energy mix rises, their intermittence proves to be the biggest challenge to carbon free electricity generation. To address this challenge, we propose an electricity pricing…