相关论文: Optimization of institutional incentives for coope…
We propose an incentive scheme based on intervention to sustain cooperation among self-interested users. In the proposed scheme, an intervention device collects imperfect signals about the actions of the users for a test period, and then…
We study the design of optimal incentives in sequential processes. To do so, we consider a basic and fundamental model in which an agent initiates a value-creating sequential process through costly investment with random success. If…
How can a social planner adaptively incentivize selfish agents who are learning in a strategic environment to induce a socially optimal outcome in the long run? We propose a two-timescale learning dynamics to answer this question in both…
Previous studies suggest that punishment is a useful way to promote cooperation in the well-mixed public goods game, whereas it still lacks specific evidence that punishment maintains cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game as well.…
Cooperation is crucial for the remarkable evolutionary success of the human species. Not surprisingly, some individuals are willing to bare additional costs in order to punish defectors. Current models assume that, once set, the fine and…
Sustaining cooperation among self-interested agents is critical for the proliferation of emerging online social communities, such as online communities formed through social networking services. Providing incentives for cooperation in…
Classification algorithms are increasingly used in areas such as housing, credit, and law enforcement in order to make decisions affecting peoples' lives. These algorithms can change individual behavior deliberately (a fraud prediction…
Properly coordinating cooperation is relevant for resolving public good problems such as clean energy and environmental protection. However, little is known about how individuals can coordinate themselves for a certain level of cooperation…
We examine behavior in an experimental collaboration game that incorporates endogenous network formation. The environment is modeled as a generalization of the voluntary contributions mechanism. By varying the information structure in a…
From ant-acacia mutualism to performative conflict resolution among Inuit, dedicated punishments between distinct subsets of a population are widespread and can reshape the evolutionary trajectory of cooperation. Existing studies have…
Indirect punishment traditionally sustains cooperation in social systems through reputation or norms, often by reducing defectors' payoffs indirectly. In this study, we redefine indirect punishment for structured populations as a spatially…
Empirical data shows that in the absence of incentives, a peer participating in a Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network wishes to free-riding. Most solutions for providing incentives in P2P networks are based on direct reciprocity, which are not…
Governments and enterprises strongly rely on incentives to generate favorable outcomes from social and strategic interactions between individuals. The incentives are usually modeled by payoffs in evolutionary games, such as the prisoner's…
In this work we investigate the inefficiency of the electricity system with strategic agents. Specifically, we prove that without a proper control the total demand of an inefficient system is at most twice the total demand of the optimal…
Whether a population of decision-making individuals will reach a state of satisfactory decisions is a fundamental problem in studying collective behaviors. In the framework of evolutionary game theory and by means of potential functions,…
We analyze a two-period principal-agent model in which the principal faces a budget constraint, and the agent's private costs of performing tasks across the two periods may be correlated. We examine the optimal design of the reward scheme…
The development of cooperative relations within and between firms plays an important role in the successful implementation of business strategy. How to produce such relations is less well understood. We build on work in relational contract…
Punishing those who refuse to participate in common efforts is a known and intensively studied way to maintain cooperation among self-interested agents. But this act is costly, hence punishers who are generally also engaged in the original…
Game theory provides a quantitative framework for analyzing the behavior of rational agents. The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma in particular has become a standard model for studying cooperation and cheating, with cooperation often emerging as…
Recent empirical studies suggest that heavy-tailed distributions of human activities are universal in real social dynamics [Muchnik, \emph{et al.}, Sci. Rep. \textbf{3}, 1783 (2013)]. On the other hand, community structure is ubiquitous in…