相关论文: The Economy's Potential: Duality and Equilibrium

Walrasian equilibrium is a prominent market equilibrium notion, but rarely exists in markets with indivisible items. We introduce a new market equilibrium notion, called two-price equilibrium (2PE). A 2PE is a relaxation of Walrasian…

We consider the resource allocation problem and its numerical solution. The following constructions are demonstrated: 1) Walrasian price-adjustment mechanism for determining the equilibrium; 2) Decentralized role of the prices; 3) Slater's…

We propose a new methodology to compute equilibria for general equilibrium problems on exchange economies with real financial markets, home-production, and retention. We demonstrate that equilibrium prices can be determined by solving a…

General equilibrium, the cornerstone of modern economics and finance, rests on assumptions many markets do not meet. Spectrum auctions, electricity markets, and cap-and-trade programs for resource rights often feature non-convexities in…

The Walras approach to equilibrium focuses on the existence of market prices at which the total demands for goods are matched by the total supplies. Trading activities that might identify such prices by bringing agents together as potential…

In electricity markets, customers are increasingly constrained by their budgets. A budget constraint for a user is an upper bound on the price multiplied by the quantity. However, since prices are determined by the market equilibrium, the…

Central results in economics guarantee the existence of efficient equilibria for various classes of markets. An underlying assumption in early work is that agents are price-takers, i.e., agents honestly report their true demand in response…

Walrasian equilibrium prices can be said to coordinate markets: They support a welfare optimal allocation in which each buyer is buying bundle of goods that is individually most preferred. However, this clean story has two caveats. First,…

Walrasian prices, if they exist, have the property that one can assign every buyer some bundle in her demand set, such that the resulting assignment will maximize social welfare. Unfortunately, this assumes carefully breaking ties amongst…

We study market mechanisms for allocating divisible goods to competing agents with quasilinear utilities. For \emph{linear} pricing (i.e., the cost of a good is proportional to the quantity purchased), the First Welfare Theorem states that…

Multi-unit auctions are a paradigmatic model, where a seller brings multiple units of a good, while several buyers bring monetary endowments. It is well known that Walrasian equilibria do not always exist in this model, however compelling…

Harsanyi (1955) showed that the only way to aggregate individual preferences into a social preference which satisfies certain desirable properties is ``utilitarianism'', whereby the social utility function is a weighted average of…

We study a combinatorial market design problem, where a collection of indivisible objects is to be priced and sold to potential buyers subject to equilibrium constraints.The classic solution concept for such problems is Walrasian…

We develop conditions under which individual choices and Walrasian equilibrium prices and allocations can be exactly inferred from finite market data. First, we consider market data that consist of individual demands as prices and incomes…

We consider a package assignment problem with multiple units of indivisible items. The seller can specify preferences over partitions of their supply between buyers as packaging costs. We propose incremental costs together with a graph that…

Recent results, establishing evidence of intractability for such restrictive utility functions as additively separable, piecewise-linear and concave, under both Fisher and Arrow-Debreu market models, have prompted the question of whether we…

Welfare economics relies on access to agents' utility functions: we revisit classical questions in welfare economics, assuming access to data on agents' past choices instead of their utilities. Our main result considers the existence of…

We study markets of indivisible items in which price-based (Walrasian) equilibria often do not exist due to the discrete non-convex setting. Instead we consider Nash equilibria of the market viewed as a game, where players bid for items,…

Large-scale online recommendation systems must facilitate the allocation of a limited number of items among competing users while learning their preferences from user feedback. As a principled way of incorporating market constraints and…

In this paper, we show that if every consumer in an economy has a quasi-linear utility function, then the normalized equilibrium price is unique, and is locally stable with respect to the t\^atonnement process. Our study can be seen as that…