相关论文: The Design and Regulation of Exchanges: A Formal A…
This paper studies four trading algorithms of a professional trader at a multilateral trading facility, observing a realistic two-sided limit order book whose dynamics are driven by the order book events. The identity of the trader can be…
We introduce weighted finite finance automata (WFFA), a formal framework for modeling and analyzing quantitative properties of financial systems driven by uncertain economic variables such as stock prices, interest rates, and exchange…
A prototype model of stock market is introduced and studied numerically. In this self-organized system, we consider only the interaction among traders without external influences. Agents trade according to their own strategy, to accumulate…
Recent literature highlights the advantages of implementing social rules via dynamic game forms. We characterize when truth-telling remains a dominant strategy in gradual mechanisms implementing strategy-proof social rules, where agents…
Current approaches for formal verification of algorithms face important limitations. For specification, they cannot express algorithms naturally and concisely, especially for algorithms with states and flexible control flow. For…
We study the design of mechanisms -- e.g., auctions -- when the designer does not control information flows between mechanism participants. A mechanism equilibrium is leakage-proof if no player conditions their actions on leaked…
Today, many auctions are carried out with the help of intermediary platforms like Google and eBay. We refer to such auctions as platform-assisted auctions.Traditionally, the auction theory literature mainly focuses on designing auctions…
Signaling is an important topic in the study of asymmetric information in economic settings. In particular, the transparency of information available to a seller in an auction setting is a question of major interest. We introduce the study…
We introduce and treat rigorously a new multi-agent model of the continuous double auction or in other words the order book (OB). It is designed to explain collective behaviour of the market when new information affecting the market…
We present FairTraDEX, a decentralized exchange (DEX) protocol based on frequent batch auctions (FBAs), which provides formal game-theoretic guarantees against extractable value. FBAs when run by a trusted third-party provide unique…
We derive valuations of a portfolio of financial instruments from a securities lending perspective, under different assumptions, and show a weighting scheme that converges to the true valuation. We illustrate conditions under which our…
Traditional economic models typically treat private information, or signals, as generated from some underlying state. Recent work has explicated alternative models, where signals correspond to interpretations of available information. We…
Consider a trade market with one seller and multiple buyers. The seller aims to sell an indivisible item and maximize their revenue. This paper focuses on a simple and popular mechanism--the fixed-price mechanism. Unlike the standard…
Financial markets are nonlinear with complexity, where different types of assets are traded between buyers and sellers, each having a view to maximize their Return on Investment (ROI). Forecasting market trends is a challenging task since…
This paper studies Markov perfect equilibria in a repeated duopoly model where sellers choose algorithms. An algorithm is a mapping from the competitor's price to own price. Once set, algorithms respond quickly. Customers arrive randomly…
We study a basic auction design problem with online supply. There are two unit-demand bidders and two types of items. The first item type will arrive first for sure, and the second item type may or may not arrive. The auctioneer has to…
Revealed preference techniques are used to test whether a data set is compatible with rational behaviour. They are also incorporated as constraints in mechanism design to encourage truthful behaviour in applications such as combinatorial…
A characteristic feature of complex systems in general is a tight coupling between their constituent parts. In complex socio-economic systems this kind of behavior leads to self-organization, which may be both desirable (e.g. social…
In top-down multi-level design methodologies, design descriptions at higher levels of abstraction are incrementally refined to the final realizations. Simulation based techniques have traditionally been used to verify that such model…
Our main contribution is a strongly polynomial algorithm for computing an equilibrium for the Arctic Auction, which is the quasi-linear extension of the linear Fisher market model. We build directly on Orlin's strongly polynomial algorithm…