相关论文: The Design and Regulation of Exchanges: A Formal A…

Formal software verification uses mathematical techniques to establish that software has certain properties. For example, that the behaviour of a software system satisfies certain logically-specified properties. Formal methods have a long…

We characterise the set of dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC), strongly budget balanced (SBB), and ex-post individually rational (IR) mechanisms for the multi-unit bilateral trade setting. In such a setting there is a single…

Using duality theory techniques we derive simple, closed-form formulas for bounding the optimal revenue of a monopolist selling many heterogeneous goods, in the case where the buyer's valuations for the items come i.i.d. from a uniform…

Prediction markets provide an efficient means to assess uncertain quantities from forecasters. Traditional and competitive strictly proper scoring rules have been shown to incentivize players to provide truthful probabilistic forecasts.…

International agreements about AI development may be required to reduce catastrophic risks from advanced AI systems. However, agreements about such a high-stakes technology must be backed by verification mechanisms--processes or tools that…

We report statistical regularities of the opening and closing auctions of French equities, focusing on the diffusive properties of the indicative auction price. Two mechanisms are at play as the auction end time nears: the typical price…

We study auction design in a setting where agents can communicate over a censorship-resistant broadcast channel like the ones we can implement over a public blockchain. We seek to design credible, strategyproof auctions in a model that…

We construct an empirically founded model of a repo trade intermediated by two broker-dealers and prove multiple equilibrium and the existence of equilibrium at the joint profit maximizing volume of trade. We then present a smart contract…

Algorithms of control of differential equations solutions are under investigation in the article. Idealized and real modifications of the algorithms are distinguished. An equation, which can be the base equation for investigation of the…

We explore the possibility of designing matching mechanisms that can accommodate non-standard choice behavior. We pin down the necessary and sufficient conditions on participants' choice behavior for the existence of stable and incentive…

In this dissertation two simple models of stock exchange are developed and simulated numerically. The first is characterized by centralized trading with a market maker. Unfortunately, this model is unable to generate realistic market…

People increasingly use digital platforms to exchange resources in accordance with some policies stating what resources users offer and what they require in return. In this paper, we propose a formal model of these environments, focussing…

Blockchain systems and smart contracts provide ways to securely implement multi-party transactions without the use of trusted intermediaries, which currently underpin many commercial transactions. However, they do so by transferring trust…

We provide simple models for the utility function (or psychology) of an actor trading a multitude of goods for money. In this framework, money has no intrinsic consumption value, but is required as a medium of exchange. A collection of such…

Using theory and experiments, this paper shows that the difficulty of making tradeoffs offers a parsimonious explanation for a wide range of behavioral phenomena. We develop a model of imprecise comparisons applicable to multiattribute,…

Contemporary real-world online ad auctions differ from canonical models [Edelman et al., 2007; Varian, 2009] in at least four ways: (1) values and click-through rates can depend upon users' search queries, but advertisers can only partially…

Methods for building fair predictors often involve tradeoffs between fairness and accuracy and between different fairness criteria, but the nature of these tradeoffs varies. Recent work seeks to characterize these tradeoffs in specific…

Building on the linear programming approach to competitive equilibrium pricing, we develop a general method for constructing iterative auctions that achieve Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) outcomes. We show how to transform a linear program…

Auction theories are believed to provide a better selling opportunity for the resources to be allocated. Various organizations have taken measures to increase trust among participants towards their auction system, but trust alone cannot…

We study the problem of online dynamic pricing with two types of fairness constraints: a "procedural fairness" which requires the proposed prices to be equal in expectation among different groups, and a "substantive fairness" which requires…