相关论文: Stable and Historic Behavior in Replicator Equatio…

In evolutionary game theory, it is customary to be partial to the dynamical models possessing fixed points so that they may be understood as the attainment of evolutionary stability, and hence, Nash equilibrium. Any show of periodic or…

In evolutionary game theory, evolutionarily stable states are characterised by the folk theorem because exact solutions to the replicator equation are difficult to obtain. It is generally assumed that the folk theorem, which is the…

Replicator dynamics, the continuous-time analogue of Multiplicative Weights Updates, is the main dynamic in evolutionary game theory. In simple evolutionary zero-sum games, such as Rock-Paper-Scissors, replicator dynamic is periodic…

The replicator equation is a simple model of evolution that leads to stable form of Nash Equilibrium, Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS). It has been studied in connection with Evolutionary Game Theory and was originally developed for…

We study the connection between the evolutionary replicator dynamics and the number of Nash equilibria in large random bi-matrix games. Using techniques of disordered systems theory we compute the statistical properties of both, the fixed…

We study repeated games where players use an exponential learning scheme in order to adapt to an ever-changing environment. If the game's payoffs are subject to random perturbations, this scheme leads to a new stochastic version of the…

We study adaptive dynamics in games where players abandon the population at a given rate, and are replaced by naive players characterized by a prior distribution over the admitted strategies. We demonstrate how such process leads…

We introduce and study the spatial replicator equation with higher order interactions and both infinite (spatially homogeneous) populations and finite (spatially inhomogeneous) populations. We show that in the special case of three…

In population games, a large population of players, modeled as a continuum, is divided into subpopulations, and the fitness or payoff of each subpopulation depends on the overall population composition. Evolutionary dynamics describe how…

The idea of evolutionarily stable state (ESS) of a population is a cornerstone of evolutionary game theory; moreover, it coincides with the game-theoretic concept of Nash equilibrium. Such a state corresponds to a strategy adopted by the…

We investigate the long-run behavior of a stochastic replicator process, which describes game dynamics for a symmetric two-player game under aggregate shocks. We establish an averaging principle that relates time averages of the process and…

We analyze the replicator-mutator equations for the Rock-Paper-Scissors game. Various graph-theoretic patterns of mutation are considered, ranging from a single unidirectional mutation pathway between two of the species, to global…

We generalize the Bush--Mosteller learning, the Roth--Erev learning, and the social learning to include mistakes such that the nonlinear replicator-mutator equation with either additive or multiplicative mutation is generated in an…

The finitely repeated Prisoners' Dilemma is a good illustration of the discrepancy between the strategic behaviour suggested by a game-theoretic analysis and the behaviour often observed among human players, where cooperation is maintained…

We consider a slightly modified version of the Rock-Scissors-Paper (RSP) game from the point of view of evolutionary stability. In its classical version the game has a mixed Nash equilibrium (NE) not stable against mutants. We find a…

Zero-sum games arise in a wide variety of problems, including robust optimization and adversarial learning. However, algorithms deployed for finding a local Nash equilibrium in these games often converge to non-Nash stationary points. This…

Recently, a new model extending the standard replicator equation to a finite set of players connected on an arbitrary graph was developed in evolutionary game dynamics. The players are interpreted as subpopulations of multipopulations…

The central result of classical game theory states that every finite normal form game has a Nash equilibrium, provided that players are allowed to use randomized (mixed) strategies. However, in practice, humans are known to be bad at…

Replicator equation -- a paradigm equation in evolutionary game dynamics -- mathematizes the frequency dependent selection of competing strategies vying to enhance their fitness (quantified by the average payoffs) with respect to the…

Discrete-time replicator map is a prototype of evolutionary selection game dynamical models that have been very successful across disciplines in rendering insights into the attainment of the equilibrium outcomes, like the Nash equilibrium…