相关论文: LQG Differential Stackelberg Game under Nested Obs…
Solving feedback Stackelberg games with nonlinear dynamics and coupled constraints, a common scenario in practice, presents significant challenges. This work introduces an efficient method for computing approximate local feedback…
This paper obtains the maximum principle for both stochastic (global) open-loop and stochastic (global) closed-loop Stackelberg differential games. For the closed-loop case, we use the theory of controlled forward-backward stochastic…
We discuss an open-loop backward Stackelberg differential game involving single leader and single follower. Unlike most Stackelberg game literature, the state to be controlled is characterized by a backward stochastic differential equation…
Guided trajectory planning involves a leader robot strategically directing a follower robot to collaboratively reach a designated destination. However, this task becomes notably challenging when the leader lacks complete knowledge of the…
This paper investigates a zero-sum stochastic linear-quadratic (SLQ, for short) Stackelberg differential game problem, where the coefficients of the state equation and the weighting matrices in the performance functional are regulated by a…
In multi-agent problems requiring a high degree of cooperation, success often depends on the ability of the agents to adapt to each other's behavior. A natural solution concept in such settings is the Stackelberg equilibrium, in which the…
Dynamic Stackelberg games are a broad class of two-player games in which the leader acts first, and the follower chooses a response strategy to the leader's strategy. Unfortunately, only stylized Stackelberg games are explicitly solvable…
This paper is concerned with a linear-quadratic mean field Stackelberg stochastic differential game with partial information and common noise, which contains a leader and a large number of followers. To be specific, the followers face a…
In this paper, we present an efficient algorithm to solve online Stackelberg games, featuring multiple followers, in a follower-agnostic manner. Unlike previous works, our approach works even when leader has no knowledge about the…
We consider a controlled linear-quadratic (LQ) large-population system with mixture of three types agents: major leader, minor leaders and minor followers. The Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot (SNC) approximate equilibrium is studied by a…
This paper is concerned with a linear quadratic stochastic Stackelberg differential game with time delay. The model is general, in which the state delay and the control delay both appear in the state equation, moreover, they both enter into…
In this paper, we consider a discrete-time stochastic Stackelberg game with a single leader and multiple followers. Both the followers and the leader together have conditionally independent private types, conditioned on action and previous…
This paper investigates open-loop and feedback solutions of linear quadratic mean field (MF) games with a leader and a large number of followers. The leader first gives its strategy and then all the followers cooperate to optimize the…
In this paper, we study a class of two-player deterministic finite-horizon difference games with coupled inequality constraints, where each player has two types of decision variables: one involving sequential interactions and the other…
We consider the following two-player game: using observational data, the leader chooses a prediction function for a response variable $Y$ from given covariates. The follower then reacts with an intervention on some covariates in the…
Information uncertainty is one of the major challenges facing applications of game theory. In the context of Stackelberg games, various approaches have been proposed to deal with the leader's incomplete knowledge about the follower's…
We study an online learning problem in general-sum Stackelberg games, where players act in a decentralized and strategic manner. We study two settings depending on the type of information for the follower: (1) the limited information…
Stackelberg games are a classic example of bilevel optimization problems, which are often encountered in game theory and economics. These are complex problems with a hierarchical structure, where one optimization task is nested within the…
This paper studies open-loop and feedback solutions to leader-follower mean field linear-quadratic-Gaussian games with multiplicative noise by the direct approach. The leader-follower game involves a leader and many followers, where the…
We consider a non-zero-sum linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) dynamic game with asymmetric information. Each player observes privately a noisy version of a (hidden) state of the world $V$, resulting in dependent private observations. We study…