相关论文: Mechanism Design Powered by Social Interactions

A recurring theme in recent computer science literature is that proper design of signaling schemes is a crucial aspect of effective mechanisms aiming to optimize social welfare or revenue. One of the research endeavors of this line of work…

We consider dynamic pricing schemes in online settings where selfish agents generate online events. Previous work on online mechanisms has dealt almost entirely with the goal of maximizing social welfare or revenue in an auction settings.…

The rapid development and deployment of vehicle technologies offer opportunities to re-think the way traffic is managed. This paper capitalizes on vehicle connectivity and proposes an economic instrument and corresponding cooperative…

We study information disclosure in competitive markets with adverse selection. Sellers privately observe product quality, with higher quality entailing higher production costs, while buyers trade at the market-clearing price after observing…

This paper focuses on the operation of an electricity market that accounts for participants that bid at a sub-minute timescale. To that end, we model the market-clearing process as a dynamical system, called market dynamics, which is…

We consider the issue of a market maker acting at the same time in the lit and dark pools of an exchange. The exchange wishes to establish a suitable make-take fees policy to attract transactions on its venues. We first solve the stochastic…

We provide a computationally efficient black-box reduction from mechanism design to algorithm design in very general settings. Specifically, we give an approximation-preserving reduction from truthfully maximizing \emph{any} objective under…

This paper studies cooperative games where coalitions are formed online and the value generated by the grand coalition must be irrevocably distributed among the players at each timestep. We investigate the fundamental issue of strategic…

Researchers have long proposed using economic approaches to resource allocation in computer systems. However, few of these proposals became operational, let alone commercial. Questions persist about the economic approach regarding its…

We study the competition for partners in two-sided matching markets with heterogeneous agent preferences, with a focus on how the equilibrium outcomes depend on the connectivity in the market. We model random partially connected markets,…

Incentives play an important role in (security and IT) risk management of a large-scale organization with multiple autonomous divisions. This paper presents an incentive mechanism design framework for risk management based on a…

In this study, we apply reinforcement learning techniques and propose what we call reinforcement mechanism design to tackle the dynamic pricing problem in sponsored search auctions. In contrast to previous game-theoretical approaches that…

Both conventional wisdom and empirical evidence suggests that arranging a prior commitment or agreement before an interaction enhances the chance of reaching mutual cooperation. Yet it is not clear what mechanisms can promote the…

In the current digital age of the Internet, with ever-growing networks and data-driven business models, digital platforms and especially marketplaces are becoming increasingly important. These platforms focus primarily on digital businesses…

We study multi-type housing markets, where there are $p\ge 2$ types of items, each agent is initially endowed one item of each type, and the goal is to design mechanisms without monetary transfer to (re)allocate items to the agents based on…

An operator-assisted user-provided network (UPN) has the potential to achieve a low cost ubiquitous Internet connectivity, without significantly increasing the network infrastructure investment. In this paper, we consider such a network…

Crowdsourcing offers unprecedented potential for solving tasks efficiently by tapping into the skills of large groups of people. A salient feature of crowdsourcing---its openness of entry---makes it vulnerable to malicious behavior. Such…

We study a novel class of mechanism design problems in which the outcomes are constrained by the payments. This basic class of mechanism design problems captures many common economic situations, and yet it has not been studied, to our…

The electricity industry has been one of the first to face technological changes motivated by sustainability concerns. Whilst efficiency aspects of market design have tended to focus upon market power concerns, the new policy challenges…

In economics, there are many ways to describe the interaction between a "seller" and a "buyer". The most common one, with which we interact almost every day, is selling for a fixed price. This option is perfect for selling a mass product,…