相关论文: Mechanism Design Powered by Social Interactions

Generative AI, such as image generation models and large language models, stands to provide tremendous value to end-user programmers in creative and knowledge workflows. Current research methods struggle to engage end-users in a realistic…

Data sharing issues pervade online social and economic environments. To foster social progress, it is important to develop models of the interaction between data producers and consumers that can promote the rise of cooperation between the…

We study Cournot competition among firms in a networked marketplace that is centrally managed by a market maker. In particular, we study a situation in which a market maker facilitates trade between geographically separate markets via a…

Improving algorithms via predictions is a very active research topic in recent years. This paper initiates the systematic study of mechanism design in this model. In a number of well-studied mechanism design settings, we make use of…

We introduce a new model of competition on growing networks. This extends the preferential attachment model, with the key property that node choices evolve simultaneously with the network. When a new node joins the network, it chooses…

Today's large language models (LLMs) are trained to align with user preferences through methods such as reinforcement learning. Yet models are beginning to be deployed not merely to satisfy users, but also to generate revenue for the…

Human computation systems (HCSs) have been widely adopted in various domains. Their goal is to harness human intelligence to solve computational problems that are beyond the capability of modern computers. One of the most challenging…

This paper investigates whether the decoy effect - specifically the attraction effect - can foster cooperation in social networks. In a lab experiment, we show that introducing a dominated option increases the selection of the target…

Motivated by the problem of market power in electricity markets, we introduced in previous works a mechanism for simplified markets of two agents with linear cost. In standard procurement auctions, the market power resulting from the…

Machine learning algorithms often make decisions on behalf of agents with varied and sometimes conflicting interests. In domains where agents can choose to take their own action or delegate their action to a central mediator, an open…

We consider a network of interacting agents and we model the process of choice on the adoption of a given innovative product by means of statistical-mechanics tools. The modelization allows us to focus on the effects of direct interactions…

Participatory crowd sensing social systems rely on the participation of large number of individuals. Since humans are strategic by nature, effective incentive mechanisms are needed to encourage participation. A popular mechanism to recruit…

In many social-choice mechanisms the resulting choice is not the most preferred one for some of the participants, thus the need for methods to justify the choice made in a way that improves the acceptance and satisfaction of said…

Prediction markets provide an efficient means to assess uncertain quantities from forecasters. Traditional and competitive strictly proper scoring rules have been shown to incentivize players to provide truthful probabilistic forecasts.…

Physical agents that can autonomously generate engaging, life-like behaviour will lead to more responsive and interesting robots and other autonomous systems. Although many advances have been made for one-to-one interactions in well…

Sponsored search mechanisms have drawn much attention from both academic community and industry in recent years since the seminal papers of [13] and [14]. However, most of the existing literature concentrates on the mechanism design and…

We introduce the notion of fault tolerant mechanism design, which extends the standard game theoretic framework of mechanism design to allow for uncertainty about execution. Specifically, we define the problem of task allocation in which…

Auction theories are believed to provide a better selling opportunity for the resources to be allocated. Various organizations have taken measures to increase trust among participants towards their auction system, but trust alone cannot…

This paper compares two leading approaches for robust optimization in the models of online algorithms and mechanism design. Competitive analysis compares the performance of an online algorithm to an offline benchmark in worst-case over…

Participatory Design's vision of democratic participation assumes participants' feelings of agency in envisioning a collective future. But this assumption may be leaky when dealing with vulnerable populations. We reflect on the results of a…