相关论文: Laplace principle for large population games with …

In the paper, we use the equivalent formulation of a finite state mean field game as a control problem with mixed constraints to study the dependence of solutions to finite state mean field game on an initial distribution of players. We…

This paper considers linear quadratic (LQ) mean field games with a major player and analyzes an asymptotic solvability problem. It starts with a large-scale system of coupled dynamic programming equations and applies a re-scaling technique…

With increasing game size, a problem of computational complexity arises. This is especially true in real world problems such as in social systems, where there is a significant population of players involved in the game, and the complexity…

We study a model of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in which the probabilities that agents choose suboptimal actions are dependent on payoff consequences. We prove a sample path large deviation principle, characterizing the rate of…

This paper presents a pioneering investigation into discrete-time two-person non-zero-sum linear quadratic (LQ) stochastic games with random coefficients. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of open-loop Nash…

In this paper, we investigate a class of mean field games where the mean field interactions are achieved through the joint (conditional) distribution of the controlled state and the control process. The strategies are of $open\;loop$ type,…

This paper investigates closed-loop Nash equilibria for discrete-time linear-quadratic (LQ) stochastic nonzero-sum difference games with random coefficients. Unlike existing works, we consider randomness in both state dynamics and cost…

In this note, we study a class of deterministic finite-horizon linear-quadratic difference games with coupled affine inequality constraints involving both state and control variables. We show that the necessary conditions for the existence…

In this paper, we investigate a new model of a linear-quadratic mean-field stochastic Stackelberg differential game with one leader and two followers, in which the leader is allowed to stop her strategy at a random time. Our overarching…

In games with a large number of players where players may have overlapping objectives, the analysis of stable outcomes typically depends on player types. A special case is when a large part of the player population consists of imitation…

We show that under some general conditions the finite memory determinacy of a class of two-player win/lose games played on finite graphs implies the existence of a Nash equilibrium built from finite memory strategies for the corresponding…

In this paper, we introduce discrete-time linear mean-field games subject to an infinite-horizon discounted-cost optimality criterion. The state space of a generic agent is a compact Borel space. At every time, each agent is randomly…

We consider 2-player stochastic games with perfectly observed actions, and study the limit, as the discount factor goes to one, of the equilibrium payoffs set. In the usual setup where current states are observed by the players, we show…

We consider a dynamical approach to game in extensive forms. By restricting the convertibility relation over strategy profiles, we obtain a semi-potential (in the sense of Kukushkin), and we show that in finite games the corresponding…

We study a static game played by a finite number of agents, in which agents are assigned independent and identically distributed random types and each agent minimizes its objective function by choosing from a set of admissible actions that…

In this paper we propose and analyze a class of $N$-player stochastic games that include finite fuel stochastic games as a special case. We first derive sufficient conditions for the Nash equilibrium (NE) in the form of a verification…

In this paper, a Nash-type fictitious game framework is introduced to handle a time-inconsistent linear-quadratic optimal control. The Nash-type game in this framework is called fictitious as it is between the decision maker (called real…

This paper studies the convergence of mean field games with finite state space to mean field games with a continuous state space. We examine a space discretization of a diffusive dynamics, which is reminiscent of the Markov chain…

The goal of the paper is to introduce a formulation of the mean field game with major and minor players as a fixed point on a space of controls. This approach emphasizes naturally the role played by McKean-Vlasov dynamics in some of the…

We study the convergence of Nash equilibria in a game of optimal stopping. If the associated mean field game has a unique equilibrium, any sequence of $n$-player equilibria converges to it as $n\to\infty$. However, both the finite and…