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This paper addresses the problem of learning an equilibrium efficiently in general-sum Markov games through decentralized multi-agent reinforcement learning. Given the fundamental difficulty of calculating a Nash equilibrium (NE), we…

This work focuses on the fulfillment of the Persistent Excitation (PE) condition for signals which result from transformations by means of polynomials. This is essential e.g. for the convergence of Adaptive Dynamic Programming algorithms…

Extensive-form games (EFGs) are a common model of multi-agent interactions with imperfect information. State-of-the-art algorithms for solving these games typically perform full walks of the game tree that can prove prohibitively slow in…

We consider a dynamical approach to game in extensive forms. By restricting the convertibility relation over strategy profiles, we obtain a semi-potential (in the sense of Kukushkin), and we show that in finite games the corresponding…

Simple adaptive procedures that converge to correlated equilibria are known to exist for normal form games (Hart and Mas-Colell 2000), but no such analogue exists for extensive-form games. Leveraging inspiration from Zinkevich et al.…

We present an algorithm for computing evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) in symmetric perfect-recall extensive-form games of imperfect information. Our main algorithm is for two-player games, and we describe how it can be extended to…

Correlated Equilibrium (CE) is a well-established solution concept that captures coordination among agents and enjoys good algorithmic properties. In real-world multi-agent systems, in addition to being in an equilibrium, agents' policies…

In this paper, we resolve the computational complexity of a number of outstanding open problems with practical applications. Here is the list of problems we show to be PPAD-complete, along with the domains of practical significance:…

Coordinate descent methods are popular in machine learning and optimization for their simple sparse updates and excellent practical performance. In the context of large-scale sequential game solving, these same properties would be…

Temporal graphs are a popular modelling mechanism for dynamic complex systems that extend ordinary graphs with discrete time. Simply put, time progresses one unit per step and the availability of edges can change with time. We consider the…

We present a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS) for computing equilibria in congestion games, under smoothed running-time analysis. More precisely, we prove that if the resource costs of a congestion game are randomly…

Robust self-testing in non-local games allows a classical referee to certify that two untrustworthy players are able to perform a specific quantum strategy up to high precision. Proving robust self-testing results becomes significantly…

The best arm identification problem requires identifying the best alternative (i.e., arm) in active experimentation using the smallest number of experiments (i.e., arm pulls), which is crucial for cost-efficient and timely decision-making…

We study routing games where every agent sequentially decides her next edge when she obtains the green light at each vertex. Because every edge only has capacity to let out one agent per round, an edge acts as a FIFO waiting queue that…

Equilibrium refinements are important in extensive-form (i.e., tree-form) games, where they amend weaknesses of the Nash equilibrium concept by requiring sequential rationality and other beneficial properties. One of the most attractive…

We show that in any $n$-player $m$-action normal-form game, we can obtain an approximate equilibrium by sampling any mixed-action equilibrium a small number of times. We study three types of equilibria: Nash, correlated and coarse…

We analyze the computational complexity of several new variants of edge-matching puzzles. First we analyze inequality (instead of equality) constraints between adjacent tiles, proving the problem NP-complete for strict inequalities but…

We study the complexity of problems related to subgame-perfect equilibria (SPEs) in infinite duration non zero-sum multiplayer games played on finite graphs with parity objectives. We present new complexity results that close gaps in the…

As part of an effort to apply the rigorous guarantees of formal verification to multi-agent systems, the field of equilibrium analysis, also called rational verification, studies equilibria in multiplayer games to reason about system-level…

We formulate and analyze a general class of stochastic dynamic games with asymmetric information arising in dynamic systems. In such games, multiple strategic agents control the system dynamics and have different information about the…