相关论文: Separating the Communication Complexity of Truthfu…
Truthfulness is fragile and demanding. It is oftentimes computationally harder than solving the original problem. Even worse, truthfulness can be utterly destroyed by small uncertainties in a mechanism's outcome. One obstacle is that…
We consider a revenue-optimizing auctioneer in single-dimensional environments with matroid feasibility constraints. Akbarpour and Li (2020) argue that any revenue-optimal, truthful, and credible mechanism requires unbounded communication.…
Representations of Boolean functions by real polynomials play an important role in complexity theory. Typically, one is interested in the least degree of a polynomial p(x_1,...,x_n) that approximates or sign-represents a given Boolean…
We study truthful mechanisms for matching and related problems in a partial information setting, where the agents' true utilities are hidden, and the algorithm only has access to ordinal preference information. Our model is motivated by the…
This paper studies the privacy-preserving distributed optimization problem under limited communication, where each agent aims to keep its cost function private while minimizing the sum of all agents' cost functions. To this end, we propose…
We characterize the communication complexity of the following distributed estimation problem. Alice and Bob observe infinitely many iid copies of $\rho$-correlated unit-variance (Gaussian or $\pm1$ binary) random variables, with unknown…
In this paper, we study online double auctions, where multiple sellers and multiple buyers arrive and depart dynamically to exchange one commodity. We show that there is no deterministic online double auction that is truthful and…
We consider budget feasible mechanisms for procurement auctions with additive valuation functions. For the divisible case, where agents can be allocated fractionally, there exists an optimal mechanism with approximation guarantee $e/(e-1)$…
This paper considers the design of non-truthful mechanisms from samples. We identify a parameterized family of mechanisms with strategically simple winner-pays-bid, all-pay, and truthful payment formats. In general (not necessarily…
We consider a revenue optimizing seller selling a single item to a buyer, on whose private value the seller has a noisy signal. We show that, when the signal is kept private, arbitrarily more revenue could potentially be extracted than if…
As statistical analyses become more central to science, industry and society, there is a growing need to ensure correctness of their results. Approximate correctness can be verified by replicating the entire analysis, but can we verify…
We give the first exponential separation between quantum and classical multi-party communication complexity in the (non-interactive) one-way and simultaneous message passing settings. For every k, we demonstrate a relational communication…
We consider the sale of a single item to multiple buyers by a revenue-maximizing seller. Recent work of Akbarpour and Li formalizes \emph{credibility} as an auction desideratum, and prove that the only optimal, credible, strategyproof…
We provide simple and approximately revenue-optimal mechanisms in the multi-item multi-bidder settings. We unify and improve all previous results, as well as generalize the results to broader cases. In particular, we prove that the better…
We consider the problem of bounded-error quantum state identification: given either state \alpha_0 or state \alpha_1, we are required to output `0', `1' or `?' ("don't know"), such that conditioned on outputting `0' or `1', our guess is…
Two general algorithms based on opportunity costs are given for approximating a revenue-maximizing set of bids an auctioneer should accept, in a combinatorial auction in which each bidder offers a price for some subset of the available…
The question of the minimum menu-size for approximate (i.e., up-to-$\varepsilon$) Bayesian revenue maximization when selling two goods to an additive risk-neutral quasilinear buyer was introduced by Hart and Nisan (2013), who give an upper…
Complements between goods - where one good takes on added value in the presence of another - have been a thorn in the side of algorithmic mechanism designers. On the one hand, complements are common in the standard motivating applications…
We consider prophet inequalities for XOS and MPH-$k$ combinatorial auctions and give a simplified proof for the existence of static and anonymous item prices which recover the state-of-the-art competitive ratios. Our proofs make use of a…
We study risk-free bidding strategies in combinatorial auctions with incomplete information. Specifically, what is the maximum profit that a complement-free (subadditive) bidder can guarantee in a multi-item combinatorial auction? Suppose…