相关论文: One-Sided Matching Markets with Endowments: Equili…

This paper unifies two foundational constructs from economics and algorithmic game theory, the Arctic Auction and the linear Fisher market, to address the efficient allocation of differentiated goods in complex markets. Our main…

We study markets of indivisible items in which price-based (Walrasian) equilibria often do not exist due to the discrete non-convex setting. Instead we consider Nash equilibria of the market viewed as a game, where players bid for items,…

This paper resolves two of the handful of remaining questions on the computability of market equilibria, a central theme within algorithmic game theory (AGT). Our results are as follows: 1. We show FIXP-hardness of computing equilibria in…

We show an auction-based algorithm to compute market equilibrium prices in a production model, where consumers purchase items under separable nonlinear utility concave functions which satisfy W.G.S(Weak Gross Substitutes); producers produce…

We study one-shot Nash competition between an arbitrary number of identical dealers that compete for the order flow of a client. The client trades either because of proprietary information, exposure to idiosyncratic risk, or a mix of both…

The emerging edge computing paradigm promises to deliver superior user experience and enable a wide range of Internet of Things (IoT) applications. In this work, we propose a new market-based framework for efficiently allocating resources…

This paper investigates the efficiency loss in social cost caused by strategic bidding behavior of individual participants in a supply-demand balancing market, and proposes a mechanism to fully recover equilibrium social optimum via…

The goal of this paper is to develop a generic framework for converting modern optimization algorithms into mechanisms where inputs come from self-interested agents. We focus on aggregating preferences from $n$ players in a context without…

We study the problem of computing approximate market equilibria in Fisher markets with separable piecewise-linear concave (SPLC) utility functions. In this setting, the problem was only known to be PPAD-complete for inverse-polynomial…

Matching markets play a prominent role in economic theory. A prime example of such a market is the sponsored search market. Here, as in other markets of that kind, market equilibria correspond to feasible, envy free, and bidder optimal…

Lindahl equilibrium is a solution concept for allocating a fixed budget across several divisible public goods. It always lies in the weak core, meaning that the equilibrium allocation satisfies desirable stability and proportional fairness…

We develop a unified ascending-auction framework for computing Walrasian equilibria in combinatorial markets with strong substitutes valuations and piecewise-linear payment functions. Our auction extends the celebrated ascending auctions of…

The Fisher market equilibrium for private goods and the Lindahl equilibrium for public goods are classic and fundamental solution concepts for market equilibria. While Fisher market equilibria have been well-studied, the theoretical…

We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. The extent of fairness of an allocation is measured by its Nash social welfare, which is the geometric mean of the valuations of the…

A two-sided market consists of two sets of agents, each of whom have preferences over the other (Airbnb, Upwork, Lyft, Uber, etc.). We propose and analyze a repeated matching problem, where some set of matches occur on each time step, and…

We consider a power utility maximization problem with additive habits in a framework of discrete-time markets and random endowments. For certain classes of incomplete markets, we establish estimates for the optimal consumption stream in…

We study two-sided many-to-one matching markets with transferable utilities, e.g., labor and rental housing markets, in which money can exchange hands between agents, subject to distributional constraints on the set of feasible allocations.…

We study an Arrow-Debreu economy with externalities generated by multiplex networks. Market equilibrium prices reflect both the preferences and scarcity of goods, consumers' network centralities arising from goods' externalities, as well as…

In this paper, we introduce a novel, non-recursive, maximal matching algorithm for double auctions, which aims to maximize the amount of commodities to be traded. It differs from the usual equilibrium matching, which clears a market at the…

The large majority of risk-sharing transactions involve few agents, each of whom can heavily influence the structure and the prices of securities. This paper proposes a game where agents' strategic sets consist of all possible sharing…