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We consider the problem of locating a single facility on the real line. This facility serves a set of agents, each of whom is located on the line, and incurs a cost equal to his distance from the facility. An agent's location is private…

We study the facility location games with candidate locations from a mechanism design perspective. Suppose there are n agents located in a metric space whose locations are their private information, and a group of candidate locations for…

We consider a strategic variant of the facility location problem. We would like to locate a facility on a closed interval. There are n agents located on that interval, divided into two types: type 1 agents, who wish for the facility to be…

We consider the facility location problem in the one-dimensional setting where each facility can serve a limited number of agents from the algorithmic and mechanism design perspectives. From the algorithmic perspective, we prove that the…

We study the facility location mechanism design problem where $n$ agents report their locations in Euclidean space, and the output is a single facility location. The cost function of each agent is the distance from the returned facility,…

We study the problem of design of strategyproof in expectation (SP) mechanisms for facility location on a cycle, with the objective of minimizing the sum of costs of $n$ agents. We show that there exists an SP mechanism that attains an…

We study the mechanism design problem of facility location on a metric space in the learning-augmented framework, where mechanisms have access to imperfect predictions of the optimal facility locations. Our objective is to design…

In this paper, we study the two-facility location game on a line with optional preference where the acceptable set of facilities for each agent could be different and an agent's cost is his distance to the closest facility within his…

In this paper, we study a truthful two-obnoxious-facility location problem, in which each agent has a private location in [0, 1] and a public optional preference over two obnoxious facilities, and there is a minimum distance constraint d…

We consider the problem of locating a facility on a network, represented by a graph. A set of strategic agents have different ideal locations for the facility; the cost of an agent is the distance between its ideal location and the…

We consider the problem of locating a single facility for 2 agents in $L_p$ space ($1<p<\infty$) and give a nearly complete characterization of such deterministic strategyproof mechanisms. We use the distance between an agent and the…

We consider the problem of locating a public facility on a line, where a set of $n$ strategic agents report their \emph{locations} and a mechanism determines, either deterministically or randomly, the location of the facility. Game…

We study a truthful facility location problem where one out of $k\geq2$ available facilities must be built at a location chosen from a set of candidate ones in the interval $[0,1]$. This decision aims to accommodate a set of agents with…

We consider the facility location problem in a metric space, focusing on the case of three agents. We show that selecting the reported location of each agent with probability proportional to the distance between the other two agents results…

We study deterministic mechanisms for the two-facility location problem. Given the reported locations of n agents on the real line, such a mechanism specifies where to build the two facilities. The single-facility variant of this problem…

We consider the strategyproof facility location problem on a circle. We focus on the case of 5 agents, and find a tight bound for the PCD strategyproof mechanism, which selects the reported location of an agent in proportion to the length…

In this paper, we propose a constrained heterogeneous facility location model where a set of alternative locations are feasible for building facilities and the number of facilities built at each location is limited. Supposing that a set of…

We consider a facility location game in which $n$ agents reside at known locations on a path, and $k$ heterogeneous facilities are to be constructed on the path. Each agent is adversely affected by some subset of the facilities, and is…

We study the problem of locating a single obnoxious facility on the normalized line segment $[0,1]$ with strategic agents from a mechanism design perspective. Each agent has a preference for the undesirable location of the facility and…

We study the distributed facility location games with candidate locations, where agents on a line are partitioned into groups. Both desirable and obnoxious facility location settings are discussed. In distributed location problems,…