相关论文: Random Assignment Under Bi-Valued Utilities: Analy…

In the budget-feasible allocation problem, a set of items with varied sizes and values are to be allocated to a group of agents. Each agent has a budget constraint on the total size of items she can receive. The goal is to compute a…

Severe impossibility results restrict the design of strategyproof random assignment mechanisms, and trade-offs are necessary when aiming for more demanding efficiency requirements, such as ordinal or rank efficiency. We introduce hybrid…

We introduce a strategic behavior in reinsurance bilateral transactions, where agents choose the risk preferences they will appear to have in the transaction. Within a wide class of risk measures, we identify agents' strategic choices to a…

We consider a multi-agent model for fair division of mixed manna (i.e. items for which agents can have positive, zero or negative utilities), in which agents have additive utilities for bundles of items. For this model, we give several…

We consider multi-agent decision making where each agent's cost function depends on all agents' strategies. We propose a distributed algorithm to learn a Nash equilibrium, whereby each agent uses only obtained values of her cost function at…

Entities in multi-agent systems may seek conflicting subobjectives, and this leads to competition between them. To address performance degradation due to competition, we consider a bi-level lottery where a social planner at the high level…

In load balancing problems there is a set of clients, each wishing to select a resource from a set of permissible ones, in order to execute a certain task. Each resource has a latency function, which depends on its workload, and a client's…

We develop polynomial-time algorithms for the fair and efficient allocation of indivisible goods among $n$ agents that have subadditive valuations over the goods. We first consider the Nash social welfare as our objective and design a…

In many realistic problems of allocating resources, economy efficiency must be taken into consideration together with social equality, and price rigidities are often made according to some economic and social needs. We study the…

This paper considers the problem of dividing agents among coalitions. We concentrate on Additively Separable Hedonic Games (ASHG's), in which each agent has a non-negative value for every other agent and her utility is the sum of the values…

We consider the assignment problem in which agents express ordinal preferences over $m$ objects and the objects are allocated to the agents based on the preferences. In a recent paper, Brams, Kilgour, and Klamler (2014) presented the AL…

Various real-life planning problems require making upfront decisions before all parameters of the problem have been disclosed. An important special case of such problem especially arises in scheduling and staff rostering problems, where a…

A long-standing open problem in algorithmic game theory asks whether or not there is a polynomial time algorithm to compute a Nash equilibrium in a random bimatrix game. We study random win-lose games, where the entries of the $n\times n$…

A number of citation indices have been proposed for measuring and ranking the research publication records of scholars. Some of the best known indices, such as those proposed by Hirsch and Woeginger, are designed to reward most highly those…

Many multiagent systems rely on collective decision-making among self-interested agents, which raises deep questions about coalition formation and stability. We study social choice with endogenous, outcome-contingent transfers, where agents…

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods (positively valued items) and chores (negatively valued items) among agents with decreasing marginal utilities over items. Our focus is on instances where all the agents have…

The Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) paradox, involving quantum systems with three or more subsystems, offers an 'all-vs-nothing' test of quantum nonlocality. Unlike Bell tests for bipartite systems, which reveal statistical…

We introduce and analyze new envy-based fairness concepts for agents with weights that quantify their entitlements in the allocation of indivisible items. We propose two variants of weighted envy-freeness up to one item (WEF1): strong,…

We consider the problem of repeatedly allocating multiple shareable public goods that have limited availability in an online setting without the use of money. In our setting, agents have additive values, and the value each agent receives…

We study the problem in which a central planner sequentially allocates a single resource to multiple strategic agents using their utility reports at each round, but without using any monetary transfers. We consider general agent utility…