相关论文: Revenue Maximizing Markets for Zero-Day Exploits

We study methods to enhance statistical privacy in blockchain transactions. We analyze economic mechanisms for privacy-aware transaction owners whose utility depends not only on the outcome of the mechanism but also negatively on the…

This paper focuses on botnet economics and design of defensive strategies. It takes the view that by combining scarce information on the attackers business models, with rational economic analysis of these business processes, one can…

We consider the problem of a single seller repeatedly selling a single item to a single buyer (specifically, the buyer has a value drawn fresh from known distribution $D$ in every round). Prior work assumes that the buyer is fully rational…

Contextual bandit algorithms have become widely used for recommendation in online systems (e.g. marketplaces, music streaming, news), where they now wield substantial influence on which items get exposed to the users. This raises questions…

Double Auction enables decentralized transfer of goods between multiple buyers and sellers, thus underpinning functioning of many online marketplaces. Buyers and sellers compete in these markets through bidding, but do not often know their…

Diffusion auction refers to an emerging paradigm of online marketplace where an auctioneer utilises a social network to attract potential buyers. Diffusion auction poses significant privacy risks. From the auction outcome, it is possible to…

Backdoor attacks are among the most effective, practical, and stealthy attacks in deep learning. In this paper, we consider a practical scenario where a developer obtains a deep model from a third party and uses it as part of a…

A seller posts a price for a single object. The seller's and buyer's values may be interdependent. We characterize the set of payoff vectors across all information structures. Simple feasibility and individual-rationality constraints…

Consider a market where a seller owns an item for sale and a buyer wants to purchase it. Each player has private information, known as their type. It can be costly and difficult for the players to reach an agreement through direct…

A ubiquitous learning problem in today's digital market is, during repeated interactions between a seller and a buyer, how a seller can gradually learn optimal pricing decisions based on the buyer's past purchase responses. A fundamental…

Individual decision-makers consume information revealed by the previous decision makers, and produce information that may help in future decisions. This phenomenon is common in a wide range of scenarios in the Internet economy, as well as…

We consider a dynamic pricing problem under unknown demand models. In this problem a seller offers prices to a stream of customers and observes either success or failure in each sale attempt. The underlying demand model is unknown to the…

In many areas of industry and society, e.g., energy, healthcare, logistics, agents collect vast amounts of data that they deem proprietary. These data owners extract predictive information of varying quality and relevance from data…

Recently, researchers have discovered that the state-of-the-art object classifiers can be fooled easily by small perturbations in the input unnoticeable to human eyes. It is also known that an attacker can generate strong adversarial…

We study arbitrage opportunities, market viability and utility maximization in market models with an insider. Assuming that an economic agent possesses from the beginning an additional information in the form of a random variable G, which…

We study envy-free pricing mechanisms in matching markets with $m$ items and $n$ budget constrained buyers. Each buyer is interested in a subset of the items on sale, and she appraises at some single-value every item in her preference-set.…

The increasing scale and sophistication of cyberattacks has led to the adoption of machine learning based classification techniques, at the core of cybersecurity systems. These techniques promise scale and accuracy, which traditional rule…

We consider the practical and classical setting where the seller is using an exploration stage to learn the value distributions of the bidders before running a revenue-maximizing auction in a exploitation phase. In this two-stage process,…

This paper studies mechanism design for revenue maximization in a distribution-reporting setting, where the auctioneer does not know the buyers' true value distributions. Instead, each buyer reports and commits to a bid distribution in the…

A decision maker is choosing between an active action (e.g., purchase a house, invest certain stock) and a passive action. The payoff of the active action depends on the buyer's private type and also an unknown state of nature. An…