相关论文: The Efficiency of Best-Response Dynamics

We consider any network environment in which the "best shot game" is played. This is the case where the possible actions are only two for every node (0 and 1), and the best response for a node is 1 if and only if all her neighbors play 0. A…

Consider a set of agents who play a network game repeatedly. Agents may not know the network. They may even be unaware that they are interacting with other agents in a network. Possibly, they just understand that their payoffs depend on an…

This paper considers a stochastic Nash game in which each player minimizes an expectation valued composite objective. We make the following contributions. (I) Under suitable monotonicity assumptions on the concatenated gradient map, we…

Decoding how rational agents should behave in shared systems remains a critical challenge within theoretical computer science, artificial intelligence and economics studies. Central to this challenge is the task of computing the solution…

We study bottleneck routing games where the social cost is determined by the worst congestion on any edge in the network. Bottleneck games have been studied in the literature by having the player's utility costs to be determined by the…

In cost sharing games, the existence and efficiency of pure Nash equilibria fundamentally depends on the method that is used to share the resources' costs. We consider a general class of resource allocation problems in which a set of…

We characterize the convergence properties of traditional best-response (BR) algorithms in computing solutions to mixed-integer Nash equilibrium problems (MI-NEPs) that turn into a class of monotone Nash equilibrium problems (NEPs) once…

This study investigates an adaptive pricing scheme aimed at achieving an efficient state in a traffic congestion game characterized by a diverse population of road users. While the planner possesses knowledge of players' preferences, their…

We investigate a time-inconsistent, non-Markovian finite-player game in continuous time, where each player's objective functional depends non-linearly on the expected value of the state process. As a result, the classical Bellman optimality…

In practical applications, decision-makers with heterogeneous dynamics may be engaged in the same decision-making process. This motivates us to study distributed Nash equilibrium seeking for games in which players are mixed-order (first-…

We introduce a new measure of the discrepancy in strategic games between the social welfare in a Nash equilibrium and in a social optimum, that we call selfishness level. It is the smallest fraction of the social welfare that needs to be…

In classical job-scheduling games, each job behaves as a selfish player, choosing a machine to minimize its own completion time. To reduce the equilibria inefficiency, coordination mechanisms are employed, allowing each machine to follow…

In order to coordinate players in a game must first identify a target pattern of behaviour. In this paper we investigate the difficulty of identifying prominent outcomes in two kinds of binary action coordination problems in social…

The design of distributed algorithms is central to the study of multiagent systems control. In this paper, we consider a class of combinatorial cost-minimization problems and propose a framework for designing distributed algorithms with a…

An atomic routing game is a multiplayer game on a directed graph. Each player in the game chooses a path -- a sequence of links that connect its origin node to its destination node -- with the lowest cost, where the cost of each link is a…

We consider a general nonzero-sum impulse game with two players. The main mathematical contribution of the paper is a verification theorem which provides, under some regularity conditions, a suitable system of quasi-variational inequalities…

An extensive literature in economics and social science addresses contests, in which players compete to outperform each other on some measurable criterion, often referred to as a player's score, or output. Players incur costs that are an…

We describe an algorithm for computing best response strategies in a class of two-player infinite games of incomplete information, defined by payoffs piecewise linear in agents' types and actions, conditional on linear comparisons of…

In this paper, we consider game problems played by (multi)-integrator agents, subject to external disturbances. We propose Nash equilibrium seeking dynamics based on gradient-play, augmented with a dynamic internal-model based component,…

In many game-theoretic settings, agents are challenged with taking decisions against the uncertain behavior exhibited by others. Often, this uncertainty arises from multiple sources, e.g., incomplete information, limited computation,…