Some coordination problems are harder than others
Abstract
In order to coordinate players in a game must first identify a target pattern of behaviour. In this paper we investigate the difficulty of identifying prominent outcomes in two kinds of binary action coordination problems in social networks: pure coordination games and anti-coordination games. For both environments, we determine the computational complexity of finding a strategy profile that (i) maximises welfare, (ii) maximises welfare subject to being an equilibrium, and (iii) maximises potential. We show that the complexity of these objectives can vary with the type of coordination problem. Objectives (i) and (iii) are tractable problems in pure coordination games, but for anti-coordination games are NP-hard. Objective (ii), finding the best Nash equilibrium, is NP-hard for both. Our results support the idea that environments in which actions are strategic complements (e.g., technology adoption) facilitate successful coordination more readily than those in which actions are strategic substitutes (e.g., public good provision).
Cite
@article{arxiv.2311.03195,
title = {Some coordination problems are harder than others},
author = {Argyrios Deligkas and Eduard Eiben and Gregory Gutin and Philip R. Neary and Anders Yeo},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2311.03195},
year = {2023}
}
Comments
arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:2305.07124