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相关论文: Dynamic Reserve Prices for Repeated Auctions: Lear…

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We study dynamic pricing where a seller repeatedly interacts with a strategic, non-myopic buyer who has a fixed private valuation and discounts future utility. Prior work focused exclusively on posted-price mechanisms, which only extract…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2026-04-28 Shiliang Zuo

In this paper, we develop a new method for finding an optimal biddingstrategy in sequential auctions, using a dynamic programming technique. Theexisting method assumes that the utility of a user is represented in anadditive form. Thus, the…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2013-01-14 Hiromitsu Hattori , Makoto Yokoo , Yuko Sakurai , Toramatsu Shintani

Online advertising banners are sold in real-time through auctions.Typically, the more banners a user is shown, the smaller the marginalvalue of the next banner for this user is. This fact can be detected bybasic ML models, that can be used…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2024-07-16 Benjamin Heymann , Rémi Chan--Renous-Legoubin , Alexandre Gilotte

Posted price mechanisms are prevalent in allocating goods within online marketplaces due to their simplicity and practical efficiency. We explore a fundamental scenario where buyers' valuations are independent and identically distributed,…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2025-05-26 José Correa , Vasilis Livanos , Dana Pizarro , Victor Verdugo

We study a class of iterative combinatorial auctions which can be viewed as subgradient descent methods for the problem of pricing bundles to balance supply and demand. We provide concrete convergence rates for auctions in this class,…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2016-06-01 Jacob Abernethy , Sébastien Lahaie , Matus Telgarsky

Motivated by practical constraints in online advertising, we investigate single-parameter auction design for bidders with constraints on their Return On Investment (ROI) -- a targeted minimum ratio between the obtained value and the…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2023-10-04 Hongtao Lv , Xiaohui Bei , Zhenzhe Zheng , Fan Wu

In online ad markets, a rising number of advertisers are employing bidding agencies to participate in ad auctions. These agencies are specialized in designing online algorithms and bidding on behalf of their clients. Typically, an agency…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2023-06-14 Yurong Chen , Qian Wang , Zhijian Duan , Haoran Sun , Zhaohua Chen , Xiang Yan , Xiaotie Deng

We introduce a dynamic mechanism design problem in which the designer wants to offer for sale an item to an agent, and another item to the same agent at some point in the future. The agent's joint distribution of valuations for the two…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2023-05-22 Christos Papadimitriou , George Pierrakos , Christos-Alexandros Psomas , Aviad Rubinstein

We design a fixed-price auction mechanism for a seller to sell multiple items in a tree-structured market. The buyers have independently drawn valuation from a uniform distribution, and the seller would like to incentivize buyers to invite…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2024-08-01 Feiyang Yu

We present an extensive analysis of the key problem of learning optimal reserve prices for generalized second price auctions. We describe two algorithms for this task: one based on density estimation, and a novel algorithm benefiting from…

机器学习 · 计算机科学 2015-06-10 Mehryar Mohri , Andres Munoz Medina

The majority of online display ads are served through real-time bidding (RTB) --- each ad display impression is auctioned off in real-time when it is just being generated from a user visit. To place an ad automatically and optimally, it is…

机器学习 · 计算机科学 2017-01-13 Han Cai , Kan Ren , Weinan Zhang , Kleanthis Malialis , Jun Wang , Yong Yu , Defeng Guo

Sellers often prescreen potential bidders, restricting participation to a select group of capable participants. Recent advances in machine learning and generative AI make this strategy increasingly viable by enabling the cost-effective…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2025-08-25 Yanwei Sun , Fupeng Sun , Chiwei Yan , Jiahua Wu

In this work, we investigate the online learning problem of revenue maximization in ad auctions, where the seller needs to learn the click-through rates (CTRs) of each ad candidate and charge the price of the winner through a pay-per-click…

信息检索 · 计算机科学 2024-03-05 Zhe Feng , Christopher Liaw , Zixin Zhou

Automated bidding to optimize online advertising with various constraints, e.g. ROI constraints and budget constraints, is widely adopted by advertisers. A key challenge lies in designing algorithms for non-truthful mechanisms with ROI…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2025-10-21 Yuan Deng , Yilin Li , Wei Tang , Hanrui Zhang

In this paper, we investigate the problem about how to bid in repeated contextual first price auctions. We consider a single bidder (learner) who repeatedly bids in the first price auctions: at each time $t$, the learner observes a context…

机器学习 · 计算机科学 2021-11-11 Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru , Zhe Feng , Guru Guruganesh

In online advertising markets, budget-constrained advertisers acquire ad placements through repeated bidding in auctions on various platforms. We present a strategy for bidding optimally in a set of auctions that may or may not be…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2023-06-14 Fransisca Susan , Negin Golrezaei , Okke Schrijvers

Online auction scenarios, such as bidding searches on advertising platforms, often require bidders to participate repeatedly in auctions for identical or similar items. Most previous studies have only considered the process by which the…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2024-02-28 Yudong Hu , Congying Han , Tiande Guo , Hao Xiao

In today's online advertising markets, a crucial requirement for an advertiser is to control her total expenditure within a time horizon under some budget. Among various budget control methods, throttling has emerged as a popular choice,…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2023-12-14 Zhaohua Chen , Chang Wang , Qian Wang , Yuqi Pan , Zhuming Shi , Zheng Cai , Yukun Ren , Zhihua Zhu , Xiaotie Deng

In this paper, we deal with the uncertainty of bidding for display advertising. Similar to the financial market trading, real-time bidding (RTB) based display advertising employs an auction mechanism to automate the impression level media…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2017-01-23 Haifeng Zhang , Weinan Zhang , Yifei Rong , Kan Ren , Wenxin Li , Jun Wang

In Bayesian single-item auctions, a monotone bidding strategy--one that prescribes a higher bid for a higher value type--can be equivalently represented as a partition of the quantile space into consecutive intervals corresponding to…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2026-02-10 Junyao Zhao