相关论文: The Empirical Core of the Multicommodity Flow Game…

Cooperative games provide an appropriate framework for fair and stable profit distribution in multiagent systems. In this paper, we study the algorithmic issues on path cooperative games that arise from the situations where some commodity…

Concurrent multi-player mean-payoff games are important models for systems of agents with individual, non-dichotomous preferences. Whilst these games have been extensively studied in terms of their equilibria in non-cooperative settings,…

In rational verification, the aim is to verify which temporal logic properties will obtain in a multi-agent system, under the assumption that agents ("players") in the system choose strategies for acting that form a game theoretic…

The matching game is a cooperative game where the value of every coalition is the maximum revenue of players in the coalition can make by forming pairwise disjoint partners. The multiple partners matching game generalizes the matching game…

We consider a multi-organizational system in which each organization contributes processors to the global pool but also jobs to be processed on the common resources. The fairness of the scheduling algorithm is essential for the stability…

We present a general framework to model strategic aspects and stable and fair resource allocations in networks via variants and generalizations of path coalitional games. In these games, a coalition of edges or vertices is successful if it…

This paper studies an incentive structure for cooperation and its stability in peer-assisted services when there exist multiple content providers, using a coalition game theoretic approach. We first consider a generalized coalition…

In many multi-agent settings, participants can form teams to achieve collective outcomes that may far surpass their individual capabilities. Measuring the relative contributions of agents and allocating them shares of the reward that…

In this paper, we consider a sequence of transferable utility (TU) coalitional games where the coalitional values are unknown but vary within certain bounds. As a solution to the resulting family of games, we formalise the notion of "robust…

A key question in cooperative game theory is that of coalitional stability, usually captured by the notion of the \emph{core}--the set of outcomes such that no subgroup of players has an incentive to deviate. However, some coalitional games…

High performance machine learning models have become highly dependent on the availability of large quantity and quality of training data. To achieve this, various central agencies such as the government have suggested for different data…

Motivated by the markets operating on fast time scales, we present a framework for online coalitional games with time-varying coalitional values and propose real-time payoff distribution mechanisms. Specifically, we design two online…

We consider a sharing economy network where agents embedded in a graph share their resources. This is a fundamental model that abstracts numerous emerging applications of collaborative consumption systems. The agents generate a random…

The core of Transferable Utility (T.U.) games is a well-known solution concept from cooperative game theory yielding a cost allocation among n agents (called players) forming a coalition that is stable (i.e. no subset of players has an…

In this dissertation, we analyze the computational properties of game-theoretic centrality measures. The key idea behind game-theoretic approach to network analysis is to treat nodes as players in a cooperative game, where the value of each…

The core is a dominant solution concept in economics and cooperative game theory; it is predominantly used for profit, equivalently cost or utility, sharing. This paper demonstrates the versatility of this notion by proposing a completely…

We study fair allocation of profit (or cost) for three central problems from combinatorial optimization: Max-Flow, MST and $b$-matching. The essentially unequivocal choice of solution concept for this purpose would be the core, because of…

In a combinatorial exchange setting, players place sell (resp. buy) bids on combinations of traded goods. Besides the question of finding an optimal selection of winning bids, the question of how to share the obtained profit is of high…

In participatory budgeting, communities collectively decide on the allocation of public tax dollars for local public projects. In this work, we consider the question of fairly aggregating the preferences of community members to determine an…

We investigate a routing game that allows for the creation of coalitions, within the framework of cooperative game theory. Specifically, we describe the cost of each coalition as its maximin value. This represents the performance that the…