相关论文: Maximum Nash Welfare and Other Stories About EFX

We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among $n$ agents with additive valuations. Envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) is arguably the most compelling fairness notion in this context. However, the existence of…

In the context of fair division, the concept of price of fairness has been introduced to quantify the loss of welfare when we have to satisfy some fairness condition. In other words, it is the price we have to pay to guarantee fairness.…

Although approximate notions of envy-freeness-such as envy-freeness up to one good (EF1)-have been extensively studied for indivisible goods, the seemingly simpler fairness concept of proportionality up to one good (PROP1) has received far…

We study the problem of fair allocation of a set of indivisible goods among $n$ agents with $k$ distinct additive valuations, with the goal of achieving approximate envy-freeness up to any good ($\alpha-\mathrm{EFX}$). It is known that EFX…

In an online fair allocation problem, a sequence of indivisible items arrives online and needs to be allocated to offline agents immediately and irrevocably. In our paper, we study the online allocation of either goods or chores. We employ…

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods among agents which are equipped with {\em leveled} valuation functions. Such preferences, that have been studied before in economics and fair division literature, capture a simple…

The existence of EFX allocations is a major open problem in fair division, even for additive valuations. The current state of the art is that no setting where EFX allocations are impossible is known, and EFX is known to exist for ($i$)…

We study the problem of finding fair and efficient allocations of a set of indivisible items to a set of agents, where each item may be a good (positively valued) for some agents and a bad (negatively valued) for others, i.e., a mixed…

We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible chores to three agents, among whom two have additive cost functions, in a fair manner. Two fairness notions under consideration are envy-freeness up to any chore (EFX) and a relaxed…

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to agents with weights corresponding to their entitlements. Previous work has shown that, when agents have binary additive valuations, the maximum weighted Nash welfare rule is…

The classic fair division problems assume the resources to be allocated are either divisible or indivisible, or contain a mixture of both, but the agents always have a predetermined and uncontroversial agreement on the (in)divisibility of…

We study the fair allocation of mixtures of indivisible goods and chores under lexicographic preferences$\unicode{x2014}$a subdomain of additive preferences. A prominent fairness notion for allocating indivisible items is envy-freeness up…

Equitability is a well-studied fairness notion in fair division, where an allocation is equitable if all agents receive equal utility from their allocation. For indivisible items, an exactly equitable allocation may not exist, and a natural…

We generalize the classic problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to the problem of \emph{fair public decision making}, in which a decision must be made on several social issues simultaneously, and, unlike the classic setting, a…

We study the problem of fairly and efficiently allocating indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. We focus on envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) -- an important fairness notion in fair division of indivisible goods. A…

We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods to a set of agents with additive valuation functions, aiming to achieve approximate envy-freeness up to any good ($\alpha$-EFX). The state-of-the-art results on the problem…

Envy-freeness is a standard benchmark of fairness in resource allocation. Since it cannot always be satisfied when the resource consists of indivisible items even when there are two agents, the relaxations envy-freeness up to one item (EF1)…

Fair division of indivisible goods is a central challenge in artificial intelligence. For many prominent fairness criteria including envy-freeness (EF) or proportionality (PROP), no allocations satisfying these criteria might exist. Two…

Neural networks have shown state-of-the-art performance in designing auctions, where the network learns the optimal allocations and payment rule to ensure desirable properties. Motivated by the same, we focus on learning fair division of…

We consider a fair division model in which agents have general valuations for bundles of indivisible items. We propose two new axiomatic properties for allocations in this model: EF1+- and EFX+-. We compare these with the existing EF1 and…