相关论文: On the Coexistence of Stability and Incentive Comp…

Recently MV18 identified and initiated work on the new problem of understanding structural relationships between the lattices of solutions of two "nearby" instances of stable matching. They also gave an application of their work to finding…

We consider a stochastic matching model with a general compatibility graph, as introduced in \cite{MaiMoy16}. We prove that most common matching policies (including FCFM, priorities and random) satisfy a particular sub-additive property,…

We propose a generalization of the classical stable marriage problem. In our model, the preferences on one side of the partition are given in terms of arbitrary binary relations, which need not be transitive nor acyclic. This generalization…

We consider active learning under incentive compatibility constraints. The main application of our results is to economic experiments, in which a learner seeks to infer the parameters of a subject's preferences: for example their attitudes…

The literature on centralized matching markets often assumes that a true preference of each player is known to herself and fixed, but empirical evidence casts doubt on its plausibility. To circumvent the problem, we consider evolutionary…

In many matching markets--such as athlete recruitment or academic admissions--participants on one side are evaluated by attribute vectors known to the other side, which in turn applies individual \emph{salience vectors} to assign relative…

We study the graphs formed from instances of the stable matching problem by connecting pairs of elements with an edge when there exists a stable matching in which they are matched. Our results include the NP-completeness of recognizing…

Two-sided matching markets describe a large class of problems wherein participants from one side of the market must be matched to those from the other side according to their preferences. In many real-world applications (e.g. content…

Incentivizing the existing participants to invite new participants to join an auction, matching or cooperative game have been extensively studied recently. One common challenge to design such incentive in these games is that the invitees…

We consider a many-to-one variant of the stable matching problem. More concretely, we consider the variant of the stable matching problem where one side has a matroid constraint. Furthermore, we consider the situation where the preference…

One of the most challenging issues of evolutionary biology concerns speciation, the emergence of new species from an initial one. The huge amount of species found in nature demands a simple and robust mechanism. Yet, no consensus has been…

In this manuscript, we investigate a fractional stochastic neutral differential equation with time delay, which includes both deterministic and stochastic components. Our primary objective is to rigorously prove the existence of a unique…

In the Stable Roommates problem, we seek a stable matching of the agents into pairs, in which no two agents have an incentive to deviate from their assignment. It is well known that a stable matching is unlikely to exist, but a stable…

We consider two-sided matching markets, and study the incentives of agents to circumvent a centralized clearing house by signing binding contracts with one another. It is well-known that if the clearing house implements a stable match and…

We study a fair division setting in which participants are to be fairly distributed among teams, where not only do the teams have preferences over the participants as in the canonical fair division setting, but the participants also have…

The stable marriage and stable roommates problems have been extensively studied due to their high applicability in various real-world scenarios. However, it might happen that no stable solution exists, or stable solutions do not meet…

The stable matching problem has been the subject of intense theoretical and empirical study since the seminal 1962 paper by Gale and Shapley. The number of stable matchings for different systems of preferences has been studied in many…

Many-to-one matching markets exist in numerous different forms, such as college admissions, matching medical interns to hospitals for residencies, assigning housing to college students, and the classic firms and workers market. In all these…

The study of stable matchings usually relies on the assumption that agents' preferences over the opposite side are complete and known. In many real markets, however, preferences might be uncertain and revealed only through costly…

We consider design of monetary mechanisms for two-sided matching. Mechanisms in the tradition of the deferred acceptance algorithm, even in variants incorporating money, tend to focus on the criterion of stability. Instead, in this work we…