Strongly Stable Matchings under Matroid Constraints
Computer Science and Game Theory
2022-09-08 v3 Theoretical Economics
Abstract
We consider a many-to-one variant of the stable matching problem. More concretely, we consider the variant of the stable matching problem where one side has a matroid constraint. Furthermore, we consider the situation where the preference of each agent may contain ties. In this setting, we consider the problem of checking the existence of a strongly stable matching, and finding a strongly stable matching if a strongly stable matching exists. We propose a polynomial-time algorithm for this problem.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2208.11272,
title = {Strongly Stable Matchings under Matroid Constraints},
author = {Naoyuki Kamiyama},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2208.11272},
year = {2022}
}
Comments
v3: small mistakes and typos are fixed