An Algorithm for Strong Stability in the Student-Project Allocation Problem with Ties
Abstract
We study a variant of the Student-Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over Students where ties are allowed in the preference lists of students and lecturers (SPA-ST). We investigate the concept of strong stability in this context. Informally, a matching is strongly stable if there is no student and lecturer such that if they decide to form a private arrangement outside of the matching via one of 's proposed projects, then neither party would be worse off and at least one of them would strictly improve. We describe the first polynomial-time algorithm to find a strongly stable matching or to report that no such matching exists, given an instance of SPA-ST. Our algorithm runs in time, where is the total length of the students' preference lists.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.1911.10262,
title = {An Algorithm for Strong Stability in the Student-Project Allocation Problem with Ties},
author = {Sofiat Olaosebikan and David Manlove},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1911.10262},
year = {2019}
}
Comments
28 pages (including References). To appear in Proceedings of CALDAM 2020: 6th Annual International Conference on Algorithms and Discrete Applied Mathematics. arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1805.09887