相关论文: A Generalization of Teo and Sethuraman's Median St…
In the theory of two-sided matching markets there are two well-known models: the marriage model (where no money is involved) and the assignment model (where payments are involved). Roth and Sotomayor (1990) asked for an explanation for the…
Let $L$ be a lattice of finite length and let $d$ denote the minimum path length metric on the covering graph of $L$. For any $\xi=(x_1,\dots,x_k)\in L^k$, an element $y$ belonging to $L$ is called a median of $\xi$ if the sum…
We show that all finite lattices, including non-distributive lattices, arise as stable matching lattices when all agents have path-independent choice functions. This result answers an open question of Blair~\cite{blair1988lattice}. In the…
The stable roommates problem is a non-bipartite version of the well-known stable matching problem. Teo and Sethuraman proved that, for each instance of the stable roommates problem in a complete graph, there exists a linear inequality…
Super-stability and strong stability are properties of a matching in the stable matching problem with ties. In this paper, we introduce a common generalization of super-stability and strong stability, which we call non-uniform stability.…
We study a natural generalization of stable matching to the maximum weight stable matching problem and we obtain a combinatorial polynomial time algorithm for it by reducing it to the problem of finding a maximum weight ideal cut in a DAG.…
We study stability notions for networked many-to-many matching markets with individually insignificant agents in distributional form. Outcomes are formulated as joint distributions over characteristics of agents and contract choices.…
Stable matching is a fundamental problem studied both in economics and computer science. The task is to find a matching between two sides of agents that have preferences over who they want to be matched with. A matching is stable if no pair…
An instance of a strongly stable matching problem (SSMP) is an undirected bipartite graph $G=(A \cup B, E)$, with an adjacency list of each vertex being a linearly ordered list of ties, which are subsets of vertices equally good for a given…
A distributive lattice structure ${\mathbf M}(G)$ has been established on the set of perfect matchings of a plane bipartite graph $G$. We call a lattice {\em matchable distributive lattice} (simply MDL) if it is isomorphic to such a…
We consider a monopolistic seller in a market that may be segmented. The surplus of each consumer in a segment depends on the price that the seller optimally charges, which depends on the set of consumers in the segment. We study which…
We apply Lattice-Linear Predicate Detection Technique to derive parallel and distributed algorithms for various variants of the stable matching problem. These problems are: (a) the constrained stable marriage problem (b) the super stable…
We study deviations by a group of agents in the three main types of matching markets: the house allocation, the marriage, and the roommates models. For a given instance, we call a matching $k$-stable if no other matching exists that is more…
For a many-to-one matching model, we study the matchings obtained through the restabilization of stable matchings that had been disrupted by a change in the population. We include a simple representation of the stable matching obtained in…
A super-stable matching, which was introduced by Irving, is a solution concept in a variant of the stable matching problem in which the preferences may contain ties. Irving proposed a polynomial-time algorithm for the problem of finding a…
In this paper the stability theorem of Borkar and Meyn is extended to include the case when the mean field is a differential inclusion. Two different sets of sufficient conditions are presented that guarantee the stability and convergence…
An instance of the super-stable matching problem with incomplete lists and ties is an undirected bipartite graph $G = (A \cup B, E)$, with an adjacency list being a linearly ordered list of ties. Ties are subsets of vertices equally good…
Let G be a finite graph with the non-k-order property (essentially, a uniform finite bound on the size of an induced sub-half-graph). A major result of the paper applies model-theoretic arguments to obtain a stronger version of…
The Balanced Stable Marriage problem is a central optimization version of the classic Stable Marriage problem. Here, the output cannot be an arbitrary stable matching, but one that balances between the dissatisfaction of the two parties,…
We prove mean and pointwise ergodic theorems for general families of averages on a semisimple algebraic (or S-algebraic) group G, together with an explicit rate of convergence when the action has a spectral gap. Given any lattice in G, we…