相关论文: Analysis of Multilevel Replicator Dynamics for Gen…
We study population dynamics under which each revising agent tests each strategy k times, with each trial being against a newly drawn opponent, and chooses the strategy whose mean payoff was highest. When k = 1, defection is globally stable…
Feedbacks between strategies and the environment are common in social-ecological, evolutionary-ecological, and even psychological-economic systems. Utilizing common resources is always a dilemma for community members, like tragedy of the…
In the framework of the paradigmatic prisoner's dilemma, we investigate the evolutionary dynamics of social dilemmas in the presence of "cooperation facilitators". In our model, cooperators and defectors interact as in the classical…
Selection in a time-periodic environment is modeled via the two-player replicator dynamics. For sufficiently fast environmental changes, this is reduced to a multi-player replicator dynamics in a constant environment. The two-player terms…
We examine the tuning of cooperative behavior in repeated multi-agent games using an analytically tractable, continuous-time, nonlinear model of opinion dynamics. Each modeled agent updates its real-valued opinion about each available…
Destructive agents, who opt out of the game and indiscriminately harm others, paradoxically foster cooperation, representing an intriguing variant of the voluntary participation strategy. Yet, their impact on cooperation remains…
Recent experimental evidence [Gruji\'c et al., PLoS ONE 5, e13749 (2010)] on the spatial Prisoner's Dilemma suggests that players choosing to cooperate or not on the basis of their previous action and the actions of their neighbors coexist…
Cooperation is a difficult proposition in the face of Darwinian selection. Those that defect have an evolutionary advantage over cooperators who should therefore die out. However, spatial structure enables cooperators to survive through the…
In this paper, we study analytically the statistics of the number of equilibria in pairwise social dilemma evolutionary games with mutation where a game's payoff entries are random variables. Using the replicator-mutator equations, we…
Myopic best-response dynamics (MBRD) capture agents' bounded rationality and can generate evolutionary outcomes that differ from those produced by widely examined imitation dynamics. In this study, we apply MBRD to a three-strategy social…
Multilevel selection is an important organizing principle that crucially underlies evolutionary processes from the emergence of cells to eusociality and the economics of nations. Previous studies on multilevel selection assumed that the…
We study the evolutionary dynamics of games under environmental feedback using replicator equations for two interacting populations. One key feature is to consider jointly the co-evolution of the dynamic payoff matrices and the state of the…
Natural selection favors the more successful individuals. This is the elementary premise that pervades common models of evolution. Under extreme conditions, however, the process may no longer be probabilistic. Those that meet certain…
The game interactions among individuals in nature are often uncertain and dynamically evolving, significantly influencing the persistence of cooperation. However, it remains a formidable challenge to effectively characterize these dynamic…
Decision-making individuals are typically either an imitator, who mimics the action of the most successful individual(s), a conformist (or coordinating individual), who chooses an action if enough others have done so, or a nonconformist (or…
Exploiting others is beneficial individually but it could also be detrimental globally. The reverse is also true: a higher cooperation level may change the environment in a way that is beneficial for all competitors. To explore the possible…
Controlling evolutionary game-theoretic dynamics is a problem of paramount importance for the systems and control community, with several applications spanning from social science to engineering. Here, we study a population of individuals…
Decision-making individuals often imitate their highest-earning fellows rather than optimize their own utilities, due to bounded rationality and incomplete information. Perpetual fluctuations between decisions have been reported as the…
We report on new stability conditions for evolutionary dynamics in the context of population games. We adhere to the prevailing framework consisting of many agents, grouped into populations, that interact noncooperatively by selecting…
We construct two models of discrete-time replicator dynamics with time delay. In the social-type model, players imitate opponents taking into account average payoffs of games played some units of time ago. In the biological-type model, new…