相关论文: Truthful Aggregation of Budget Proposals

We consider the efficient outcome of a canonical economic market model involving buyers and sellers with independent and identically distributed random valuations and costs, respectively. When the number of buyers and sellers is large, we…

Participatory budgeting (PB) is a democratic process where citizens jointly decide on how to allocate public funds to indivisible projects. This paper focuses on PB processes where citizens may give additional money to projects they want to…

We study online combinatorial auctions with production costs proposed by Blum et al. using the online primal dual framework. In this model, buyers arrive online, and the seller can produce multiple copies of each item subject to a…

In pursuit of participatory budgeting (PB) outcomes with broader fairness guarantees, we initiate the study of lotteries over discrete PB outcomes. As the projects have heterogeneous costs, the amount spent may not be equal ex ante and ex…

Participatory budgeting engages the public in the process of allocating public money to different types of projects. PB designs differ in how voters are asked to express their preferences over candidate projects and how these preferences…

For the fundamental problem of allocating a set of resources among individuals with varied preferences, the quality of an allocation relates to the degree of fairness and the collective welfare achieved. Unfortunately, in many…

Motivated by civic problems such as participatory budgeting and multiwinner elections, we consider the problem of public good allocation: Given a set of indivisible projects (or candidates) of different sizes, and voters with different…

In this paper, we extend the museum pass problem to incorporate the market structure. To be more precise, we consider that museums are organized into several pass programs or consortia. Within this framework, we propose four allocation…

We consider a model where a subset of candidates must be selected based on voter preferences, subject to general constraints that specify which subsets are feasible. This model generalizes committee elections with diversity constraints,…

We consider a task of scheduling with a common deadline on a single machine. Every player reports to a scheduler the length of his job and the scheduler needs to finish as many jobs as possible by the deadline. For this simple problem,…

When aggregating preferences of agents via voting, two desirable goals are to incentivize agents to participate in the voting process and then identify outcomes that are Pareto efficient. We consider participation as formalized by Brandl,…

In multi-item screening, optimal selling mechanisms are challenging to characterize and implement, even with full knowledge of valuation distributions. In this paper, we aim to develop tractable, interpretable, and implementable mechanisms…

We study a generalization of the standard approval-based model of participatory budgeting (PB), in which voters are providing approval ballots over a set of predefined projects and -- in addition to a global budget limit, there are several…

Public goods are often either over-consumed in the absence of regulatory mechanisms, or remain completely unused, as in the Covid-19 pandemic, where social distance constraints are enforced to limit the number of people who can share public…

We study mechanism design for nonexcludable and excludable binary public project problems. We aim to maximize the expected number of consumers and the expected social welfare. For the nonexcludable public project model, we identify a…

Motivated by large-market applications such as crowdsourcing, we revisit the problem of budget-feasible mechanism design under a "small-bidder assumption". Anari, Goel, and Nikzad (2018) gave a mechanism that has optimal competitive ratio…

We study a classic Bayesian mechanism design setting of monopoly problem for an additive buyer in the presence of budgets. In this setting a monopolist seller with $m$ heterogeneous items faces a single buyer and seeks to maximize her…

We design mechanisms for maintaining public goods which require periodic in-kind contributions, motivated by incentives problems facing crowd-sourced recommender systems. Utilitarian welfare is maximized by redistributive policies which are…

We consider a market setting of agents with additive valuations over heterogeneous divisible resources. Agents are assigned a budget of tokens (possibly unequal budgets) they can use to obtain resources; leftover tokens are worthless. We…

Allocating conflicting jobs among individuals while respecting a budget constraint for each individual is an optimization problem that arises in various real-world scenarios. In this paper, we consider the situation where each individual…