相关论文: Optimal Solutions to Infinite-Player Stochastic Te…

We study stochastic team (known also as decentralized stochastic control or identical interest stochastic dynamic game) problems with large or countably infinite number of decision makers, and characterize existence and structural…

This paper studies convex stochastic dynamic team problems with finite and infinite time horizons under decentralized information structures. First, we introduce two notions called exchangeable teams and symmetric information structures. We…

We study a class of stochastic exchangeable teams with a finite number of decision makers (DMs) as well as their mean-field limits with infinitely many DMs. In the finite population regime, we study exchangeable teams under the centralized…

We study a class of stochastic exchangeable teams comprising a finite number of decision makers (DMs) as well as their mean-field limits involving infinite numbers of DMs. In the finite population regime, we study exchangeable teams under…

Decentralized optimization of distributed stochastic differential systems has been an active area of research for over half a century. Its formulation utilizing static team and person-by-person optimality criteria is well investigated.…

Across science and engineering, mean-field methods have been a powerful and versatile approach for the analysis of systems of many interacting elements. However, common arguments used to characterize an infinite population limit can be…

In this paper, we demonstrate the existence of team-optimal strategies for static teams under observation-sharing information structures. Assuming that agents can access shared observations, we begin by converting the team problem into an…

Stochastic dynamic teams and games are rich models for decentralized systems and challenging testing grounds for multi-agent learning. Previous work that guaranteed team optimality assumed stateless dynamics, or an explicit coordination…

In stochastic optimal control, change of measure arguments have been crucial for stochastic analysis. Such an approach is often called static reduction in dynamic team theory (or decentralized stochastic control) and has been an effective…

We consider a cooperative multi-agent system consisting of a team of agents with decentralized information. Our focus is on the design of symmetric (i.e. identical) strategies for the agents in order to optimize a finite horizon team…

We study the problem of achieving decentralized coordination by a group of strategic decision makers choosing to engage or not in a task in a stochastic setting. First, we define a class of symmetric utility games that encompass a broad…

In this paper, we consider discrete-time dynamic games of the mean-field type with a finite number $N$ of agents subject to an infinite-horizon discounted-cost optimality criterion. The state space of each agent is a locally compact Polish…

In this paper, we consider linear quadratic team problems with an arbitrary number of quadratic constraints in both stochastic and deterministic settings. The team consists of players with different measurements about the state of nature.…

We examine the problem of the existence of optimal deterministic stationary strategiesintwo-players antagonistic (zero-sum) perfect information stochastic games with finitely many states and actions.We show that the existenceof such…

In this paper, we establish the existence of team-optimal policies for static teams and a class of sequential dynamic teams. We first consider the static team problems and show the existence of optimal policies under certain regularity…

We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between players; formally, in the games we consider, the payoff of a player has increasing differences between her own state and the empirical…

In this paper, we identify sufficient conditions under which static teams and a class of sequential dynamic teams admit team-optimal solutions. We first investigate the existence of optimal solutions in static teams where the observations…

We study stochastic mean-field games among finite number of teams with large finite as well as infinite number of decision makers. For this class of games within static and dynamic settings, we establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium,…

This work studies the behaviors of two large-population teams competing in a discrete environment. The team-level interactions are modeled as a zero-sum game while the agent dynamics within each team is formulated as a collaborative…

In this paper, we introduce regularized stochastic team problems. Under mild assumptions, we prove that there exists an unique fixed point of the best response operator, where this unique fixed point is the optimal regularized team decision…