相关论文: Super-stability in the Student-Project Allocation …
Algorithmic stability is a central concept in statistics and learning theory that measures how sensitive an algorithm's output is to small changes in the training data. Stability plays a crucial role in understanding generalization,…
The Stable Matching Problem with Couples (SMP-C) is a ubiquitous real-world extension of the stable matching problem (SMP) involving complementarities. Although SMP can be solved in polynomial time, SMP-C is NP-Complete. Hence, it is not…
A super-stable matching, which was introduced by Irving, is a solution concept in a variant of the stable matching problem in which the preferences may contain ties. Irving proposed a polynomial-time algorithm for the problem of finding a…
In a stable matching problem there are two groups of agents, with agents on one side having their individual preferences for agents on another side as a potential match. It is assumed silently that agents can freely and costlessly ``switch"…
We apply Lattice-Linear Predicate Detection Technique to derive parallel and distributed algorithms for various variants of the stable matching problem. These problems are: (a) the constrained stable marriage problem (b) the super stable…
We consider a variant of socially stable marriage problem where preference lists may be incomplete, may contain ties and may have bounded length. In real world application like NRMP and Scottish medical matching scheme such restrictions…
We introduce a generalized version of the famous Stable Marriage problem, now based on multi-modal preference lists. The central twist herein is to allow each agent to rank its potentially matching counterparts based on more than one…
When computing stable matchings, it is usually assumed that the preferences of the agents in the matching market are fixed. However, in many realistic scenarios, preferences change over time. Consequently, an initially stable matching may…
We introduce a new and broader formulation of the stable marriage problem (SMP), called the stable polygamy problem (SPP), where multiple individuals from a larger group $L$ of $|L|$ individuals can be matched with a single individual from…
We present a polynomial-time $\frac{3}{2}$-approximation algorithm for the problem of finding a maximum-cardinality stable matching in a many-to-many matching model with ties and laminar constraints on both sides. We formulate our problem…
In the Stable Roommates Problem (SR), a set of $2n$ agents rank one another in a linear order. The goal is to find a matching that is stable: one that has no pair of agents who mutually prefer each other over their assigned partners. We…
We highlight the tension between stability and equality in non transferable utility matching. We consider many to one matchings and refer to the two sides of the market as students and schools. The latter have aligned preferences, which in…
In many matching markets--such as athlete recruitment or academic admissions--participants on one side are evaluated by attribute vectors known to the other side, which in turn applies individual \emph{salience vectors} to assign relative…
We study the many-to-many bipartite matching problem in the presence of preferences where ties, as well as lower quotas, may appear on both sides of the bipartition. The input is a bipartite graph $G=(A \cup B, E)$, where each vertex in $A…
In the roommate matching model, given a set of 2n agents and n rooms, we find an assignment of a pair of agents to a room. Although the roommate matching problem is well studied, the study of the model when agents have preference over both…
Static Code Analyzers (SCAs) have played a critical role in software quality assurance. However, SCAs with various static analysis techniques suffer from different levels of false positives and false negatives, thereby yielding the varying…
We continue and extend previous work on the parameterized complexity analysis of the NP-hard Stable Roommates with Ties and Incomplete Lists problem, thereby strengthening earlier results both on the side of parameterized hardness as well…
An instance of the super-stable matching problem with incomplete lists and ties is an undirected bipartite graph $G = (A \cup B, E)$, with an adjacency list being a linearly ordered list of ties. Ties are subsets of vertices equally good…
The Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples (HRC) models the allocation of intending junior doctors to hospitals where couples are allowed to submit joint preference lists over pairs of (typically geographically close) hospitals. It is…
Many allocation problems in multiagent systems rely on agents specifying cardinal preferences. However, allocation mechanisms can be sensitive to small perturbations in cardinal preferences, thus causing agents who make ``small" or…