相关论文: Walrasian Dynamics in Multi-unit Markets

An important part of the Smart Grid literature on residential Demand Response deals with game-theoretic consumption models. Among those papers, the hourly billing model is of special interest as an intuitive and fair mechanism. We focus on…

We consider the efficient outcome of a canonical economic market model involving buyers and sellers with independent and identically distributed random valuations and costs, respectively. When the number of buyers and sellers is large, we…

Entities in multi-agent systems may seek conflicting subobjectives, and this leads to competition between them. To address performance degradation due to competition, we consider a bi-level lottery where a social planner at the high level…

A line of recent work provides welfare guarantees of simple combinatorial auction formats, such as selling m items via simultaneous second price auctions (SiSPAs) (Christodoulou et al. 2008, Bhawalkar and Roughgarden 2011, Feldman et al.…

We consider the problem of designing an expected-revenue maximizing mechanism for allocating multiple non-perishable goods of $k$ varieties to flexible consumers over $T$ time steps. In our model, a random number of goods of each variety…

We consider the classic problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods among agents with additive valuation functions and explore the connection between two prominent fairness notions: maximum Nash welfare (MNW) and envy-freeness up to any…

We study linear Fisher markets with satiation. In these markets, sellers have earning limits and buyers have utility limits. Beyond natural applications in economics, these markets arise in the context of maximizing Nash social welfare when…

We consider a game where a finite number of retailers choose a location, given that their potential consumers are distributed on a network. Retailers do not compete on price but only on location, therefore each consumer shops at the closest…

We consider a periodic double auction (PDA) setting where buyers of the auction have multiple (but finite) opportunities to procure multiple but fixed units of a commodity. The goal of each buyer participating in such auctions is to reduce…

We consider a network of prosumers involved in peer-to-peer energy exchanges, with differentiation price preferences on the trades with their neighbors, and we analyze two market designs: (i) a centralized market, used as a benchmark, where…

We study the envy free pricing problem faced by a seller who wishes to maximize revenue by setting prices for bundles of items. If there is an unlimited supply of items and agents are single minded then we show that finding the revenue…

We consider the process of bidding by electricity suppliers in a day-ahead market context where each supplier bids a linear non-decreasing function of her generating capacity with the goal of maximizing her individual profit given other…

Understanding the convergence landscape of multi-agent learning is a fundamental problem of great practical relevance in many applications of artificial intelligence and machine learning. While it is known that learning dynamics converge to…

In this paper we study variations of the standard Hotelling-Downs model of spatial competition, where each agent attracts the clients in a restricted neighborhood, each client randomly picks one attractive agent for service. Two utility…

We introduce a strategic behavior in reinsurance bilateral transactions, where agents choose the risk preferences they will appear to have in the transaction. Within a wide class of risk measures, we identify agents' strategic choices to a…

We study a multi-player stochastic differential game, where agents interact through their joint price impact on an asset that they trade to exploit a common trading signal. In this context, we prove that a closed-loop Nash equilibrium…

We provide a new, much simplified and straightforward proof to a result of Pavlov [2011] regarding the revenue maximizing mechanism for selling two goods with uniformly i.i.d. valuations over intervals $[c,c+1]$, to an additive buyer. This…

We study the rise in the acceptability fiat money in a Kiyotaki-Wright economy by developing a method that can determine dynamic Nash equilibria for a class of search models with genuine heterogenous agents. We also address open issues…

Consider a trade market with one seller and multiple buyers. The seller aims to sell an indivisible item and maximize their revenue. This paper focuses on a simple and popular mechanism--the fixed-price mechanism. Unlike the standard…

A collective choice problem is a finite set of social alternatives and a finite set of economic agents with vNM utility functions. We associate a public goods economy with each collective choice problem and establish the existence and…