相关论文: Networked Fairness in Cake Cutting

In fair division applications, agents may have unequal entitlements reflecting their different contributions. Moreover, the contributions of agents may depend on the allocation itself. Previous fairness notions designed for agents with…

We consider the problem of fair allocation of indivisible items with subsidies when agents have weighted entitlements. After highlighting several important differences from the unweighted case, we present several results concerning weighted…

The concept of fair orientations in graphs was introduced by Christodoulou, Fiat, Koutsoupias, and Sgouritsa in 2023, naturally modeling fair division scenarios in which resources are only contested by neighbors. In this model, vertices…

We study a fair allocation problem of indivisible items under additive externalities in which each agent also receives values from items that are assigned to other agents. We propose several new fairness concepts. We extend the well-studied…

Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) have achieved remarkable success across diverse applications. However, due to the biases in the graph structures, graph neural networks face significant challenges in fairness. Although the original user graph…

Given an initial resource allocation, where some agents may envy others or where a different distribution of resources might lead to higher social welfare, our goal is to improve the allocation without reassigning resources. We consider a…

We study the classic problem of dividing a collection of indivisible resources in a fair and efficient manner among a set of agents having varied preferences. Pareto optimality is a standard notion of economic efficiency, which states that…

We study searching and sorting in rounds motivated by a fair division question: given a cake cutting problem with $n$ players, compute a fair allocation in at most $k$ rounds of interaction with the players. Rounds interpolate between the…

Given a set of n sticks of various (not necessarily different) lengths, what is the largest length so that we can cut k equally long pieces of this length from the given set of sticks? We analyze the structure of this problem and show that…

We study the problem of allocating indivisible items to agents with additive valuations, under the additional constraint that bundles must be connected in an underlying item graph. Previous work has considered the existence and complexity…

\textit{Fair division} of resources among competing agents is a fundamental problem in computational social choice and economic game theory. It has been intensively studied on various kinds of items (\textit{divisible} and…

We prove an $\Omega(n^2)$ lower bound on the query complexity of local proportionality in the Robertson-Webb cake-cutting model. Local proportionality requires that each agent prefer their allocation to the average of their neighbors'…

Envy-freeness is a widely studied notion in resource allocation, capturing some aspects of fairness. The notion of envy being inherently subjective though, it might be the case that an agent envies another agent, but that she objectively…

Sampling technique has become one of the recent research focuses in the graph-related fields. Most of the existing graph sampling algorithms tend to sample the high degree or low degree nodes in the complex networks because of the…

We study the problem of fair division of a set of indivisible goods with connectivity constraints. Specifically, we assume that the goods are represented as vertices of a connected graph, and sets of goods allocated to the agents are…

We consider a multi-agent resource allocation setting in which an agent's utility may decrease or increase when an item is allocated. We take the group envy-freeness concept that is well-established in the literature and present stronger…

In contrast to the classical cake-cutting problem (how to fairly divide a desirable object), "chore division" is the problem of how to divide an undesirable object. We develop the first explicit algorithm for envy-free chore division among…

We study the classic cake cutting problem from a mechanism design perspective, in particular focusing on deterministic mechanisms that are strategyproof and fair. We begin by looking at mechanisms that are non-wasteful and primarily show…

We study the fair division of divisible bad resources with strategic agents who can manipulate their private information to get a better allocation. Within certain constraints, we are particularly interested in whether truthful envy-free…

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to agents in an online setting, where goods arrive sequentially and must be allocated irrevocably. Focusing on the popular fairness notions of envy-freeness, proportionality, and…