相关论文: Competitive division of a mixed manna

We study equilibria of markets with $m$ heterogeneous indivisible goods and $n$ consumers with combinatorial preferences. It is well known that a competitive equilibrium is not guaranteed to exist when valuations are not gross substitutes.…

We discuss price competition when positive network effects are the only other factor in consumption choices. We show that partitioning consumers into two groups creates a rich enough interaction structure to induce negative marginal demand…

We consider a market in which both suppliers and consumers compete for a product via scalar-parameterized supply offers and demand bids. Scalar-parameterized offers/bids are appealing due to their modeling simplicity and desirable…

We study the problem of allocating divisible resources among $n$ agents, hopefully in a fair and efficient manner. With the presence of strategic agents, additional incentive guarantees are also necessary, and the problem of designing fair…

Product diversity is one of the prominent factors for customers' satisfaction, while from the firms' perspective, the additional engineering costs required for product diversity should not exceed the acquired profits from the increase in…

We study the fair division problem of allocating $m$ indivisible goods to $n$ agents with additive personalized bi-valued utilities. Specifically, each agent $i$ assigns one of two positive values $a_i > b_i > 0$ to each good, indicating…

Ann likes oranges much more than apples; Bob likes apples much more than oranges. Tomorrow they will receive one fruit that will be an orange or an apple with equal probability. Giving one half to each agent is fair for each realization of…

There are clear benefits associated with a particular consumer choice for many current markets. For example, as we consider here, some products might carry environmental or `green' benefits. Some consumers might value these benefits while…

We study competitive equilibrium in the canonical Fisher market model, but with indivisible goods. In this model, every agent has a budget of artificial currency with which to purchase bundles of goods. Equilibrium prices match between…

This paper studies optimal bundling of products with non-additive values. Under monotonic preferences and single-peaked profits, I show a monopolist finds pure bundling optimal if and only if the optimal sales volume for the grand bundle is…

We study the question of dividing a collection of indivisible goods amongst a set of agents. The main objective of research in the area is to achieve one of two goals: fairness or efficiency. On the fairness side, envy-freeness is the…

Fair division of indivisible goods is a very well-studied problem. The goal of this problem is to distribute $m$ goods to $n$ agents in a "fair" manner, where every agent has a valuation for each subset of goods. We assume general…

Allocating conflicting jobs among individuals while respecting a budget constraint for each individual is an optimization problem that arises in various real-world scenarios. In this paper, we consider the situation where each individual…

Welfare economics relies on access to agents' utility functions: we revisit classical questions in welfare economics, assuming access to data on agents' past choices instead of their utilities. Our main result considers the existence of…

We model competition on a credence goods market governed by an imperfect label, signaling high quality, as a rank-order tournament between firms. In this market interaction, asymmetric firms jointly and competitively control the aggregate…

In frequently repeated matching scenarios, individuals may require diversification in their choices. Therefore, when faced with a set of potential outcomes, each individual may have an ideal lottery over outcomes that represents their…

We study a problem where wireless service providers compete for heterogenous wireless users. The users differ in their utility functions as well as in the perceived quality of service of individual providers. We model the interaction of an…

Multiplicative Kantian equilibrium explains cooperative behavior in social dilemmas without abandoning methodological individualism. However, its outcomes depend critically on the parametrization of the strategy space - the property of…

We study auctions whose bidders are embedded in a social or economic network. As a result, even bidders who do not win the auction themselves might derive utility from the auction, namely, when a friend wins. On the other hand, when an…

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods among a set of agents. Our focus is on the existence of allocations that give each agent their maximin fair share--the value they are guaranteed if they divide the goods into as…