相关论文: A two player zerosum game where only one player ob…

This paper studies partially observable two-person zero-sum semi-Markov games under a probability criterion, in which the system state may not be completely observed. It focuses on the probability that the accumulated rewards of player 1…

The paper is concerned with a variant of the continuous-time finite state Markov game of control and stopping where both players can affect transition rates, while only one player can choose a stopping time. We use the dynamic programming…

We study zero-sum repeated games where the minimizing player has to pay a certain cost each time he changes his action. Our contribution is twofold. First, we show that the value of the game exists in stationary strategies, depending solely…

We consider the general model of zero-sum repeated games (or stochastic games with signals), and assume that one of the players is fully informed and controls the transitions of the state variable. We prove the existence of the uniform…

This paper studies a 2-players zero-sum Dynkin game arising from pricing an option on an asset whose rate of return is unknown to both players. Using filtering techniques we first reduce the problem to a zero-sum Dynkin game on a…

Consider the first exit time of one-dimensional Brownian motion $\{B_s\}_{s\geq 0}$ from a random passageway. We discuss a Brownian motion with two time-dependent random boundaries in quenched sense. Let $\{W_s\}_{s\geq 0}$ be an other…

We consider 2-players, 2-values minimization games where the players' costs take on two values, $a,b$, $a<b$. The players play mixed strategies and their costs are evaluated by unimodal valuations. This broad class of valuations includes…

In this paper, we study a class of zero-sum two-player stochastic differential games with the controlled stochastic differential equations and the payoff/cost functionals of recursive type. As opposed to the pioneering work by Fleming and…

We study two-player security games which can be viewed as sequences of nonzero-sum matrix games played by an Attacker and a Defender. The evolution of the game is based on a stochastic fictitious play process. Players do not have access to…

We consider 2-player zero-sum stochastic games where each player controls his own state variable living in a compact metric space. The terminology comes from gambling problems where the state of a player represents its wealth in a casino.…

This paper develops an algorithm for upper- and lower-bounding the value function for a class of linear time-varying games subject to convex control sets. In particular, a two-player zero-sum differential game is considered where the…

In this paper we study zero-sum two-player stochastic differential games with jumps with the help of theory of Backward Stochastic Differential Equations (BSDEs). We generalize the results of Fleming and Souganidis [10] and those by Biswas…

Optimization under uncertainty is a fundamental problem in learning and decision-making, particularly in multi-agent systems. Previously, Feldman, Kalai, and Tennenholtz [2010] demonstrated the ability to efficiently compete in repeated…

We consider a stochastic differential equation that is controlled by means of an additive finite-variation process. A singular stochastic controller, who is a minimizer, determines this finite-variation process, while a discretionary…

For zero-sum two-player continuous-time games with integral payoff and incomplete information on one side, one shows that the optimal strategy of the informed player can be computed through an auxiliary optimization problem over some…

We consider two person zero-sum games where the players control, at discrete times {tn} induced by a partition $\Pi$ of R + , a continuous time Markov state process. We prove that the limit of the values v$\Pi$ exist as the mesh of $\Pi$…

A two-person zero-sum infinite dimensional differential game of infinite duration with discounted payoff involving hybrid controls is studied. The minimizing player is allowed to take continuous, switching and impulse controls whereas the…

This paper studies a variant of the contest model introduced in Seel and Strack [J. Econom. Theory 148 (2013) 2033-2048]. In the Seel-Strack contest, each agent or contestant privately observes a Brownian motion, absorbed at zero, and…

We consider zero-sum stochastic games with perfect information and finitely many states and actions. The payoff is computed by a function which associates to each infinite sequence of states and actions a real number. We prove that if the…

Pursuit-evasion scenarios appear widely in robotics, security domains, and many other real-world situations. We focus on two-player pursuit-evasion games with concurrent moves, infinite horizon, and discounted rewards. We assume that the…