相关论文: On Matching and Thickness in Heterogeneous Dynamic…
We study a dynamic matching setting where homogeneous agents arrive at random according to a Poisson process and randomly form edges yielding a sparse market. Agents stay in the market according to a certain sojourn time and wait to be…
We introduce a simple benchmark model of dynamic matching in networked markets, where agents arrive and depart stochastically and the network of acceptable transactions among agents forms a random graph. We analyze our model from three…
We study dynamic matching in exchange markets with easy- and hard-to-match agents. A greedy policy, which attempts to match agents upon arrival, ignores the positive externality that waiting agents generate by facilitating future matchings.…
In this paper, we study a matching market model on a bipartite network where agents on each side arrive and depart stochastically by a Poisson process. For such a dynamic model, we design a mechanism that decides not only which agents to…
We study the problem of matching agents who arrive at a marketplace over time and leave after d time periods. Agents can only be matched while they are present in the marketplace. Each pair of agents can yield a different match value, and…
Service platforms must determine rules for matching heterogeneous demand (customers) and supply (workers) that arrive randomly over time and may be lost if forced to wait too long for a match. Our objective is to maximize the cumulative…
We study a dynamic matching problem on a two-sided platform with unbalanced patience, in which long-lived supply accumulates over time with a unit waiting cost per period, while short-lived demand departs if not matched promptly. High- or…
We study a dynamic non-bipartite matching problem. There is a fixed set of agent types, and agents of a given type arrive and depart according to type-specific Poisson processes. Agent departures are not announced in advance. The value of a…
Supply networks require collaboration in a competitive environment. To achieve this, nodes in the network often form symbiotic relationships as they can be adversely effected by the closure of companies in the network, especially where…
We study the competition for partners in two-sided matching markets with heterogeneous agent preferences, with a focus on how the equilibrium outcomes depend on the connectivity in the market. We model random partially connected markets,…
This paper explores a novel extension of dynamic matching theory by analyzing a three-way matching problem involving agents from three distinct populations, each with two possible types. Unlike traditional static or two-way dynamic models,…
Matching platforms, from ridesharing to food delivery to competitive gaming, face a fundamental operational dilemma: match agents immediately to minimize waiting costs, or delay to exploit the efficiency gains of thicker markets. Yet…
We study a continuous-time, infinite-horizon dynamic bipartite matching problem. Suppliers arrive according to a Poisson process; while waiting, they may abandon the queue at a uniform rate. Customers on the other hand must be matched upon…
In a dynamic matching market, such as a marriage or job market, how should agents balance accepting a proposed match with the cost of continuing their search? We consider this problem in a discrete setting, in which agents have cardinal…
We study how information perturbations can destabilize two-sided matching markets. In our model, agents arrive on the market over two periods, while agents in the first period do not know the types of those arriving later. Agents already…
We study the problem of matching agents who arrive at a marketplace over time and leave after d time periods. Agents can only be matched while they are present in the marketplace. Each pair of agents can yield a different match value, and…
An approximation of strategyproofness in large, two-sided matching markets is highly evident. Through simulations, one can observe that the percentage of agents with useful deviations decreases as the market size grows. Furthermore, there…
We study the problem of dynamic matching in heterogeneous networks, where agents are subject to compatibility restrictions and stochastic arrival and departure times. In particular, we consider networks with one type of easy-to-match agents…
When several two-sided matching markets merge into one, it is inevitable that some agents will become worse off if the matching mechanism used is stable. I formalize this observation by defining the property of integration monotonicity,…
Two-sided matching markets, environments in which two disjoint groups of agents seek to partner with one another, arise in several contexts. In static, centralized markets where agents know their preferences, standard algorithms can yield a…