相关论文: On Truthful Mechanisms for Maximin Share Allocatio…

Consider N cooperative but non-communicating players where each plays one out of M arms for T turns. Players have different utilities for each arm, representable as an NxM matrix. These utilities are unknown to the players. In each turn…

The goal of fair division is to distribute resources among competing players in a "fair" way. Envy-freeness is the most extensively studied fairness notion in fair division. Envy-free allocations do not always exist with indivisible goods,…

We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of $m$ goods among $n$ agents in the asymptotic setting, where each item's value for each agent is drawn from an underlying joint distribution. Prior works have shown that if this distribution…

We consider upper and lower bounds for maxmin allocations of a completely divisible good in both competitive and cooperative strategic contexts. We then derive a subgradient algorithm to compute the exact value up to any fixed degree of…

We study the problem of fair allocation for indivisible goods. We use the the maxmin share paradigm introduced by Budish as a measure for fairness. Procaccia and Wang (EC'14) were first to investigate this fundamental problem in the…

We study no-money mechanisms for allocating indivisible items to strategic agents with additive preferences under a stochastic model. In this model, items' values are drawn from an underlying distribution and mechanisms are evaluated with…

Allocating resources to individuals in a fair manner has been a topic of interest since the ancient times, with most of the early rigorous mathematical work on the problem focusing on infinitely divisible resources. Recently, there has been…

The restricted max-min fair allocation problem seeks an allocation of resources to players that maximizes the minimum total value obtained by any player. It is NP-hard to approximate the problem to a ratio less than 2. Comparing the current…

We study truthful mechanisms for welfare maximization in online bipartite matching. In our (multi-parameter) setting, every buyer is associated with a (possibly private) desired set of items, and has a private value for being assigned an…

We study the problem of fairly dividing a heterogeneous resource, commonly known as cake cutting and chore division, in the presence of strategic agents. While a number of results in this setting have been established in previous works,…

We consider item allocation to individual agents who have additive valuations, in settings in which there are protected groups, and the allocation needs to give each protected group its "fair" share of the total welfare. Informally, within…

We consider a variation on the classical finance problem of optimal portfolio design. In our setting, a large population of consumers is drawn from some distribution over risk tolerances, and each consumer must be assigned to a portfolio of…

We study a fair resource scheduling problem, where a set of interval jobs are to be allocated to heterogeneous machines controlled by agents. Each job is associated with release time, deadline, and processing time such that it can be…

We study fair mechanisms for the classic job scheduling problem on unrelated machines with the objective of minimizing the makespan. This problem is equivalent to minimizing the egalitarian social cost in the fair division of chores. The…

We consider the division of a finite number of homogeneous divisible items among three players. Under the assumption that each player assigns a positive value to every item, we characterize the optimal allocations and we develop two exact…

We consider the problem of fair allocation of indivisible items among $n$ agents with additive valuations, when agents have equal entitlements to the goods, and there are no transfers. Best-of-Both-Worlds (BoBW) fairness mechanisms aim to…

We study the allocation of shared resources over multiple rounds among competing agents, via the dynamic max-min fair (DMMF) mechanism: the good in each round is allocated to the requesting agent with the least number of allocations…

We consider the discrete assignment problem in which agents express ordinal preferences over objects and these objects are allocated to the agents in a fair manner. We use the stochastic dominance relation between fractional or randomized…

This work addresses fair allocation of indivisible items in settings wherein it is feasible to create copies of resources or dispose of tasks. We establish that exact maximin share (MMS) fairness can be achieved via limited duplication of…

We consider fair allocations of indivisible goods to agents with general monotone valuations. We observe that it is useful to introduce a new share-based fairness notion, the {\em residual maximin share} (RMMS). This share is {\em feasible}…