English

Fair assignment of indivisible objects under ordinal preferences

Computer Science and Game Theory 2015-06-18 v4 Artificial Intelligence

Abstract

We consider the discrete assignment problem in which agents express ordinal preferences over objects and these objects are allocated to the agents in a fair manner. We use the stochastic dominance relation between fractional or randomized allocations to systematically define varying notions of proportionality and envy-freeness for discrete assignments. The computational complexity of checking whether a fair assignment exists is studied for these fairness notions. We also characterize the conditions under which a fair assignment is guaranteed to exist. For a number of fairness concepts, polynomial-time algorithms are presented to check whether a fair assignment exists. Our algorithmic results also extend to the case of unequal entitlements of agents. Our NP-hardness result, which holds for several variants of envy-freeness, answers an open question posed by Bouveret, Endriss, and Lang (ECAI 2010). We also propose fairness concepts that always suggest a non-empty set of assignments with meaningful fairness properties. Among these concepts, optimal proportionality and optimal weak proportionality appear to be desirable fairness concepts.

Keywords

Cite

@article{arxiv.1312.6546,
  title  = {Fair assignment of indivisible objects under ordinal preferences},
  author = {Haris Aziz and Serge Gaspers and Simon Mackenzie and Toby Walsh},
  journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1312.6546},
  year   = {2015}
}

Comments

extended version of a paper presented at AAMAS 2014

R2 v1 2026-06-22T02:34:00.766Z