相关论文: On Truthful Mechanisms for Maximin Share Allocatio…

We investigate fairness in the allocation of indivisible items among groups of agents using the notion of maximin share (MMS). While previous work has shown that no nontrivial multiplicative MMS approximation can be guaranteed in this…

The classic cake cutting problem concerns the fair allocation of a heterogeneous resource among interested agents. In this paper, we study a public goods variant of the problem, where instead of competing with one another for the cake, the…

We study a problem where a group of agents has to decide how a joint reward should be shared among them. We focus on settings where the share that each agent receives depends on the subjective opinions of its peers concerning that agent's…

We consider game-theoretically secure distributed protocols for coalition games that approximate the Shapley value with small multiplicative error. Since all known existing approximation algorithms for the Shapley value are randomized, it…

We consider a repeated game where a player self-reports her usage of a service and is charged a payment accordingly by a center. The center observes a partial signal, representing part of the player's true consumption, which is generated…

We study the computational complexity of fair division of indivisible items in an enriched model: there is an underlying graph on the set of items. And we have to allocate the items (i.e., the vertices of the graph) to a set of agents in…

A rapidly growing literature on lying in behavioral economics and psychology shows that individuals often do not lie even when lying maximizes their utility. In this work, we attempt to incorporate these findings into the theory of…

In standard fair division models, we assume that all agents are selfish. However, in many scenarios, division of resources has a direct impact on the whole group or even society. Therefore, we study fair allocations of indivisible items…

In multi-item screening, optimal selling mechanisms are challenging to characterize and implement, even with full knowledge of valuation distributions. In this paper, we aim to develop tractable, interpretable, and implementable mechanisms…

We consider a task of scheduling with a common deadline on a single machine. Every player reports to a scheduler the length of his job and the scheduler needs to finish as many jobs as possible by the deadline. For this simple problem,…

A set of objects is to be divided fairly among agents with different tastes, modeled by additive utility-functions. If we consider the objects as indivisible, many instances of the decision problem: ``Is there a fair division of the objects…

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to groups of agents. Agents in the same group share the same set of goods even though they may have different preferences. Previous work has focused on unanimous fairness, in which…

It is often beneficial for agents to pool their resources in order to better accommodate fluctuations in individual demand. Many multi-round resource allocation mechanisms operate in an online manner: in each round, the agents specify their…

We study fairness in the allocation of discrete goods. Exactly fair (envy-free) allocations are impossible, so we discuss notions of approximate fairness. In particular, we focus on allocations in which the swap of two items serves to…

We consider the problem of fairly dividing a set of items. Much of the fair division literature assumes that the items are `goods' i.e., they yield positive utility for the agents. There is also some work where the items are `chores' that…

Single minded agents have strict preferences, in which a bundle is acceptable only if it meets a certain demand. Such preferences arise naturally in scenarios such as allocating computational resources among users, where the goal is to…

In this paper, we study the classic problem of fairly allocating indivisible items with the extra feature that the items lie on a line. Our goal is to find a fair allocation that is contiguous, meaning that the bundle of each agent forms a…

We study procurement games where each seller supplies multiple units of his item, with a cost per unit known only to him. The buyer can purchase any number of units from each seller, values different combinations of the items differently,…

We consider the problem of approximate maximin share (MMS) allocation of indivisible items among three agents with additive valuation functions. For goods, we show that an $\frac{11}{12}$ - MMS allocation always exists, improving over the…

We study the game-theoretic task of selecting mobile agents to deliver multiple items on a network. An instance is given by $m$ messages (physical objects) which have to be transported between specified source-target pairs in a weighted…